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This dissertation is composed of four experimental studies on the economics 
of pro-social behaviors.  
 
The first two essays focus on a donation-soliciting strategy known as category 
reporting. Using category reporting, charities publicly announce individual 
donations according to pre-specified categories ranked by the size of donations. 
Chapter 1 explores on the mechanism that allows this strategy to be more 
effective than other donation plans. We show that category reporting is 
superior due to the dual presence of the publicity effect and the category effect. 
The publicity effect arises because donors are given public acknowledgement 
when qualifying for the category. This gives prestige. The category effect 
arises because the category provides a subtle reference donation point. Our 
experiment disentangles these two effects and shows that, when the threshold 
is low, the category effect is more salient than the publicity effect. Otherwise, 
the reverse is true. This suggests that when prestige is costly, individuals are 
willing to pay for it and the pursuit for prestige can be one of the motivations 
of charitable giving.  
 
Chapter 2 differs from Chapter 1 in that it focuses on the gender differences in 
their responses to category reporting. We show that women's average 
donations vary little with the category level or the publicity channel, but not 
men. Men give much more than women when the generous giving behavior 
could be known to others, and they give much less than women when such 
behavior remains private. Compared to women, men value a generous image 
and conform more to the profile of "image-seeker" in charitable giving. . 
 
In Chapter 3, we study the distributive preferences of an unaffected third party 
 vi
 within a group by allowing him to directly affect the payoff of a passive 
recipient. Upon observing a dictator’s allocation to a recipient in a dictator 
game, the third party can punish the dictator and/or compensate the recipient. 
We find that compensation is preferred to punishment as a means of 
third-party intervention. On average, the subjects have a higher propensity to 
compensate and spend more on compensation than on punishment conditional 
on the amount the dictator transfers. Furthermore, there are two common 
triggers of third-party punishment and compensation: inequality in payoffs 
between the third party and the relevant reference player, and violation of the 
fairness norm. The fairness norm is more salient than the inequality aversion 
norm. We also find a high degree of individual heterogeneity in the subject 
pool. About 85% of subjects can be categorized as own-payoff maximizers, 
unconditional interveners, or conditional interveners. 
 
In Chapter 4, we evaluate an individual’s budget allocation between himself 
and two different recipients. In particular, we examine how the availability of 
another option to express one’s social preferences affects his existing 
expression. We find that people behave as if they have a fixed budget to 
allocate between one-self and other beneficiaries. Different beneficiaries and 
types of social preferences are considered to be irrelevant in determining the 
overall proportion of wealth allocated to others. Interestingly, when we further 
zoom in into the nature of this other regarding behavior, we find that people do 
not treat different beneficiaries and types of social preferences differently. 
There is no evidence of crowding out of the existing other-regarding decision 
when an additional option to express other-regarding concern is available. 
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Category Reporting in Charitable Giving: 
An Experimental Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
To raise donations from potential donors, charities employ a variety of 
solicitation tools, including mail-campaign drives, matching-donation schemes, 
road shows, charity raffles (lotteries), and donation reporting plans. One 
donation reporting plan often employed is category reporting. Under this plan, 
charities publicly announce individual donations according to pre-specified 
categories ranked by the size of donations. Those who donate a sum lower 
than the lowest threshold amount specified for the lowest category would not 
have their donations publicly reported. In contrast, those who donate an 
amount that falls within one of the pre-specified categories would have their 
donations publicly reported and, and placed in a donor honor roll. 
There are many examples of the practical use of category reportings. For 
instance, the Illinois Valley Symphony Orchestra gives donors public 
recognition as contributor, sponsor, patron, guarantor, or sustainer if they 
donate an amount of, respectively, US$25-49, US$50-99, US$100-249, 
US$250-499, or over US$5001. Another example is Multiple Births Canada 
(MBC), a charitable organization that provides support for multiple-birth 
                                                        
1 See http://www.ivso.org for more information. 
 1
 families and individuals in Canada2. 
Their donors are given public recognition as donor, supporter, friend of 
MBC, contributing member, sustaining member, patron, or founding member 
if they donate an amount of, respectively, US$1-249, US$250-499, 
US$500-999, US$1000-4999, US$5000-9999, US$10,000-29,999, or over 
US$30,000. Other organizations that often employ category reportings include 
city libraries, art institutions, science centers, and schools. 
The prevalence of category reportings implies that charities perceive them 
as an effective way to raise public funds. Harbaugh's (1998a) explanation of 
the effectiveness of category reportings in generating donations is based on the 
premise that donors are prestige seekers. The use of a category reporting 
allows donors to be publicly recognized, and being publicly recognized gives 
donors benefits of prestige. Consequently, donors who attach significant value 
to prestige and social image would have an incentive to qualify for the 
category threshold. A sufficiently high category threshold acts as a screening 
device separating donors who value prestige highly from those who do not. 
Donors who have a low valuation of prestige benefits and social image have 
no incentive to donate an amount that would qualify for the category 
threshold. 
Indeed, using data on donations from a group of lawyers to their alma mater 
law school, Harbaugh (1998b) estimates a utility function that has as its 
arguments prestige and intrinsic benefits of giving and derived parameter 
estimates of the utility function. Using these parameter estimates, Harbaugh 
calculates the predicted amount of solicited donations under a category 
reporting and compares them with the predicted amount of solicited donations 
under both a no-reporting plan and an exact-reporting plan. He shows that 
category reporting generates the highest donations, and he attributes this 
positive impact of the plan to donors' desire when making charitable 
                                                        
2 See http://www.multiplebirthscanada.org for more information. 
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 contributions to pursue prestige benefits and positive social images. 
While this structural estimation result is persuasive in showing the 
superiority of category reportings, it is, however, not immediately apparent 
whether the resulting incremental donations generated using such plans can 
actually be fully attributed to donors' prestige motive for giving. This is 
because, under category reportings, two important elements are essentially in 
operation, and their presence and interaction could potentially influence 
donors' charitable behavior. The first element is the public disclosure, which 
gives rise to the publicity effect. The prestige motive for giving exists only 
when the publicity channel is in present. The second element is the category 
setting, which gives rise to the category effect. It exists because of the mere 
presence of the category brackets regardless of whether donations are publicly 
reported and a title of recognition awarded. These category brackets 
potentially serve as reference donation points for donors to decide on the 
appropriate amount to donate. In the presence of these category brackets, 
donors' charitable contribution might be anchored around them.  
In this paper, we aim to disentangle the publicity effect and the category 
effect of category reporting. This effort would not only shed light on the 
underlying mechanism behind the superiority of category reporting to other 
reporting plans, but would also enable us to gauge the extent to which each 
effect influences donors' charitable-giving behaviors. 
For these purposes, in our study we conducted a charity game experiment. 
Subjects in our experiment were given an endowment and asked to make a 
real donation to Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières), a 
humanitarian charitable organization. We constructed a 2×2 between-subject 
experimental design whereby donations were either categorized or not 
categorized and donations were either publicly reported or not publicly 
reported. This design gave rise to four experimental treatments, each of which 
represented a different donation reporting plan: the exact reporting (ER) plan, 
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 the category reporting (CR) plan, the no-reporting (NR) plan, and the category 
no-reporting (CNR) plan. In brief, under the ER plan all donations were 
publicly reported per their exact amount, while under the CR plan only 
qualifying donations were publicly reported. Under the NR plan there was 
neither category bracket nor public reporting. Under the CNR plan, a category 
scheme was utilized, but donors who qualified for the specified category were 
not publicly reported. For simplicity, in experimental treatments involving 
categorization, i.e., under the CR plan and CNR plan, we set only one category 
bracket. However, we ran several experimental sessions whereby we varied 
the threshold level to qualify for the category bracket from low to high. In 
total, we had four threshold levels. 
Our experimental design enabled us to untangle the category effect and the 
publicity effect. We could evaluate the effect of category setting on donors' 
charitable behavior by comparing the donation amounts solicited under the NR 
plan with those under the CNR plan. In these two treatments, there was no 
public reporting, and the only differentiating factor was the presence of the 
category bracket in the CNR plan. Similarly, we could evaluate the effect of 
publicity on donors' charitable behaviors by comparing the donation amounts 
solicited under the CNR plan with those under the CR plan. The only 
differentiating factor between these two treatments was the presence of public 
reporting. 
We found that the use of the CR plan significantly increased average 
donations relative to the NR plan and that this superiority of the CR plan was 
due to the dynamic interaction between the category effect and the publicity 
effect. The results showed that both category setting and public reporting per 
se could increase solicited donations. Furthermore, the category effect 
dominated the publicity effect at lower category levels, but the category effect 
was dominated by the publicity effect at the highest category level. 
Our paper is the first to systematically examines the effectiveness of 
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 different reporting plans in charitable giving. The previous studies focused 
more on the exact reporting plan and its publicity effect in public goods games. 
Our paper extends the previous study into a real charity game and implements 
the often utilized category reporting to evaluate its comparative performance. 
2. Overview of the Literature 
The willingness of people to give away some of their hard-earned money to 
charities is well documented. In 2010 alone, Americans donated slightly more 
than US$290 billion to charity. This is roughly equivalent to 2 percent of the 
US disposable personal income. More than 73 percent of these donations came 
from individual donors (Giving USA Foundation, 2011). Giving away 
hard-earned money to charities is incompatible with the basic assumption of 
traditional economic theory, which states that a person's utility, obtained from 
choosing a particular action, depends only on his or her own monetary payoffs, 
and not on other people's monetary payoffs. To reconcile the theory with 
individuals' apparent willingness to engage in charitable giving, economists 
have introduced altruism as an important factor that motivates people to give 
to charities3. 
Altruistic people would be willing to sacrifice their own monetary payoffs 
for the benefit of others, either because they inherently care about other 
people's well-being (pure altruism) or simply because they receive utility or 
private benefits from the very act of giving (impure altruism). 
Impure altruism can take two forms. The first is warm-glow giving 
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990), which is giving that is motivated by the pursuit of 
good feeling derived from the act of giving itself. The second form of impure 
altruism is image-motivated giving, which is giving that is motivated by the 
                                                        
3 See Kolm (1969), Warr (1982), Roberts (1984), Bergstrom et al. (1986), and Andreoni (1989, 
1990). 
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 pursuit of non-pecuniary private benefits accrued from having a good social 
image. Impure altruism thus highlights the important role of non-pecuniary 
private benefits in charitable giving. It also illustrates that charitable giving 
could be driven by selfish motive rather than by regard for other people's 
well-being. In particular, image-motivated giving can be explained using the 
theory of social exchange (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964), which argues that 
people are willing to exchange pecuniary rewards such as part of their 
monetary income with non-pecuniary benefits accrued from, for example, 
having good social image. Among the many examples of this image-motivated 
giving are: the aspiration to have giving behavior known to others in order to 
gain social approval (Hollander, 1990), the desire to signal income to others 
(Glazer and Konrad, 1996), the incentive to gain prestige (Harbaugh, 1998a), 
and the desire to build a pro-social image (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). 
2.1 The Publicity Effect 
Several related experimental papers in the literature focus on the effect of 
public disclosure of subjects' contributions and identities on individuals' 
engagement in pro-social behavior. Using a public-goods contribution game, 
Rege and Telle (2004) experimentally show that revealing subjects' identities 
and contributions lead to significantly higher contributions. Andreoni and 
Petrie (2004) also found a similar effect on contributions when subjects' 
identities are publicly revealed using photographs. In both studies, the control 
treatment is the one with full anonymity of subjects. Interestingly, the 
magnitudes of the increase in contributions differ between these two studies. 
In the former there is a 98.26 percent increase in contributions, while in the 
latter the increase is only 58.75 percent. This differing impact of public 
disclosure on contributions suggests that the strength of the publicity effect 
emanating from the public disclosure of subjects' identities and/or 
contributions is sensitive to the way subjects' identities are disclosed to the 
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 public. The publicity effect is likely to be stronger when the disclosure is done 
as in Rege and Telle (2004), where each subject was required to physically 
come forward one by one on stage to reveal his/her contribution in front of all 
the other subjects. In contrast, in the study by Andreoni and Petrie (2004), 
computers were used: Subjects' photographs were shown on computer screens, 
and subjects' contributions were listed underneath these photographs, with 
contributions ranked in descending order. Subjects in their study did not face 
the same intensity of public scrutiny as those in the study by Rege and Telle 
(2004). 
In earlier research, Croson and Marks (1998), using the threshold 
public-goods game, also found that contributions increase substantially when 
both the identities and the contributions of subjects are publicly disclosed 
relative to when only contributions are publicly disclosed. Pan and Houser 
(2011) showed that displayable rewards led to larger contributions, especially 
among male subjects, when compared to non-displayable rewards. 
Our study is most related to Harbaugh (1998a,b). Harbaugh (1998a) 
presents a theoretical model that explains the role of prestige in increasing 
donors' contributions, while Harbaugh (1998b) also presents a structural-based 
econometrics analysis to estimate the importance of prestige in charitable 
giving. Both papers, however, have a potential shortcoming. As mentioned 
above, there are essentially two important elements of category reportings: 
public disclosure and the accompanying title of honor; and the category 
thresholds themselves. We broadly define the former as the publicity effect of 
category reporting, and the latter as the category effect of the plan. The former 
would motivate donors who value prestige to donate more, and the latter 
would suggest to donors the appropriate donation amount. Harbaugh's theory 
cannot distinguish between these two effects, and the result of his empirical 
analysis on the prestige motive for giving may be confounded by the presence 
of the category effect. 
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 Our study disentangled the impact of the two effects on donors' 
contributions. On the publicity effect, we evaluated how donations vary with 
the magnitude of prestige obtained by donors. Note that the magnitude of 
prestige obtained would depend on how the publicity is carried out. For this, 
we compared donations generated under the NR plan, wherein donors receive 
no prestige from donating, with those generated under the ER plan, wherein 
donors receive some prestige from donating, and the CR plan, wherein donors 
potentially receive large amounts of prestige by qualifying for the donation 
category bracket. 
2.2 The Category Effect 
The category effect arises since the stated category threshold in category 
reporting could provide a reference point for donors when they decide on the 
appropriate amount to donate. On possible mechanism is that the threshold 
amount might create an anchor point for the donors, which leads them to 
adjust their donation amount around this category threshold. First shown by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), such anchoring effect has been found in a 
wide range of areas such as estimations, predictions, social judgments, and 
legal decisions4. Other than the anchoring effect, there might be other factors 
in work. For example, as subjects might have limited information about what 
would be an appropriate amount, they might see the category threshold as a 
social norm. An effort to conform to the perceived social norm would cause a 
clustering around the threshold. A recent study by Gneezy et al. (2012) 
provided further evidence of donor’s dependence on the suggested giving 
amount. They found that donors would tend to opt out in a pay-what-you-want 
pricing mechanism to avoid feeling bad when they gave less than the 
“appropriate” price. 
                                                        
4 See Epley (2004) for a survey of literature on the anchoring effect. 
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 Consequently, when the category threshold increases, donors might be 
induced to donate a greater amount. Obviously, when the category threshold 
further increases, other things remaining equal, there might be a point where 
the positive impact of the category on donations would no longer exist. It is 
worth mentioning that the existence of the category effect is independent of 
the presence of public disclosure. That is, even when donations are not 
publicly reported, the category effect will still be present as long as the 
donation category is utilized. 
Our study on the category effect in charitable giving is also related to the 
studies on the effectiveness of suggested donations. These prior studies, 
however, offer inconclusive results. Brockner et al. (1984) and Fraser et al. 
(1988) showed that, relative to not providing any suggestion, suggesting a 
small amount of donation would increase the contribution rate. However, it 
has no effect on the absolute amount of total donations solicited5. In their field 
experiments of direct-mail solicitations, both List and Karlan (2007) and 
Smith and Berger (1996) found that suggested donations have no influence on 
donors' giving decisions6.  
Reingen (1982) and Fraser et al. (1988) found that the total amount of 
donations is higher when the suggested donation amount increases. However, 
Brockner et al. (1984), Smith and Weyant (1987), and Smith and Berger (1996) 
                                                        
5 Brockner et al. (1984) conducted a field study of door-to-door and telephone donation 
solicitation both with a suggested donation amount, i.e., either US$1 or US$5, and with no 
suggestion at all. Potential donors were required to make a donation pledge and were 
approached later for real donations. Fraser et al. (1988) sent out trained interviewers in a 
similar door-to-door donation-solicitation campaign with differing suggested donation 
amounts. Some potential donors were approached with a specific US$20 request, while others 
were approached without any specific donation amount requested. 
6 In both studies, the suggested donation amounts given to donors were customized according 
to their past donations. Smith and Berger (1996) suggested to donors a 15 percent increase in 
donations from the past-year donation and rounded it up to the nearest hundred. List and 
Karlan (2007) used three suggested donation amounts: donors' previous highest donation, a 25 
percent increase, and a 50 percent increase from the past-year donation. 
 
 9
 found that the total donation amounts generated under a suggested-donation 
scheme are not statistically different from those generated under a 
no-suggested-donation scheme. 
Using a threshold public-goods game, Croson and Marks (2001) studied the 
impact of suggested contributions on the likelihood of efficient public-goods 
provision. In one treatment, they varied the subjects' valuation of the public 
goods, and in the other treatment they kept it uniform across subjects. They 
found that having suggested contributions increases overall contributions and 
hence also increases the probability of efficient public-goods provision in the 
heterogeneous valuation treatment, but not in the homogenous valuation 
treatment. Further, they found that individual contributions are closer to the 
suggested amounts in the heterogeneous valuation treatment than in the 
homogenous valuation treatment. 
A positive effect of suggested donations was also found in a recent field 
experimental study by Shang and Croson (2009). They show in their paper 
that giving verbal information on another donor's past giving amount to 
calling-in donors participating in an on-air fundraising campaign for a public 
radio station results in larger donations. They used three suggested donation 
amounts: US$70, US$180, and US$300. Donors who called in to contribute 
were told that another donor had given one of those amounts. The authors 
found the suggested amount of US$300 to be the most effective. Donors gave 
more under this condition than under the no-suggested-donation condition. 
The provision of suggested donations also changed their overall distribution. 
Donations tended not to deviate too widely from the suggested donation 
amounts. This positive impact of suggested donations in Shang and Croson's 
study can be attributed to the impact of social comparison and the desire to 
conform to the perceived social norm inferred from the past decisions of other 
donors. This is essentially a different mechanism than ours. In our study, 
providing a suggested donation, i.e., the category threshold also increased 
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 contributions when the suggested amount was sufficiently high, as in Shang 
and Croson (2009). However, our mechanism relied on donors' pursuit of 
prestige rather than on social comparison. It is worth noting that in Shang and 
Croson's study the identities of donors who donated at least US$300 were not 
publicly disclosed. In contrast, in our study, once donors gave an amount that 
was equal to or larger than the category threshold, their donations would be 
disclosed and they would also be awarded a title of honor. 
Using a repeated public-goods game, and in comparison to not providing 
any suggestion, Dale and Morgan (2010) found that, if an aggressive 
suggestion is made to people to contribute all of their endowment, total 
contributions decrease. On the other hand, making a somewhat moderate 
suggestion to contribute 70 percent of their endowment does not increase total 
contributions. In their paper, contributing an amount equal to or larger than the 
suggested amount does not bring any prestige, because contributions are not 
publicly disclosed. No one other than the subjects themselves know how much 
they have contributed to the provision of public goods. This setup is similar 
only to our CNR plan, whereby donations were treated as private information. 
It is also worth mentioning that, in the studies mentioned above, the 
suggested donation amounts were set in an ad-hoc manner. No justifications 
are given for the way these suggested donation amounts was determined. In 
our study, however, the category thresholds were set in a systematic way, as 
explained in the next section. 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
3.1 Experimental Design 
Our experiment was designed to investigate the effectiveness of a CR plan 
relative to an NR plan and an ER plan. The underlying argument on why CR 
could be more effective in generating donations than NR, as also pointed out 
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 by Harbaugh (1998a,b), is that, under the CR plan, donors obtain prestige from 
qualifying for the donation category, and the pursuit of prestige motivates 
donors to give more. However, evaluating the extent of donors' responsiveness 
to prestige from a direct comparison of donations under the CR plan and NR 
plan is problematic because under the CR plan there are essentially two 
confounding factors: the publicity effect and the category effect. Both 
potentially exert a positive impact on donations. Prestige benefits can be 
realized only when the publicity effect is present. To disentangle these two 
effects, we ran an experimental treatment involving a CNR plan. Under this 
plan, the category setting is still present; however, donors who qualified for 
the category would not be publicly disclosed or receive any award of status. 
Essentially, this solicitation plan is similar to the suggested-donation scheme 
that is often employed in the field by charitable organizations7. 
For simplicity, in our experiment we set only one category bracket for both 
the CR and the CNR plan, but we varied the category threshold from low to 
high and ran a between-subject experimental design to evaluate the impact of a 
change in the category threshold on donations. Under the CR plan, donors who 
gave no less than the threshold amount for the category bracket would be 
publicly acknowledged as star donors. We designated the NR plan as our 
control (baseline) treatment. Under this plan, there was neither category 
setting nor public reporting, so donors donated to the charity in an anonymous 
fashion. Their donation decisions would represent either their intrinsic 
altruistic motive for giving or their warm-glow motive for giving. In addition, 
we ran an experimental treatment involving the ER plan whereby the exact 
amount of donation made by each donor was publicly disclosed. Thus, under 
                                                        
7 In some cases, donors can donate any other amount, and in some others, they can only 
donate the recommended default amount(s).  
See_http://bmy.typepad.com/making_giving_better/2009/03/default-donation-amounts-why-2
5.html,_http://googlecheckout.blogspot.com/2009/12/google-checkout-for-non-profits-in-2010
.html, and https://inetapps.nus.edu.sg/odf/ for more information and examples. 
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 the ER plan, there would be publicity, but no category setting was employed, 
and no title of recognition was awarded to donors. In all, our 2×2 experimental 
design comprised NR, ER, CR, and CNR treatments (see Table 1.1).  
 
Category: Star Donor
without with  (4 levels)
Publicity
(by ID)
without No Reporting (NR) Category No Reporting (CNR)
with Exact Reporting (ER) Category Reporting (CR)  
Table 1.1 The 2x2 Experimental Design 
 
Since there were four category-threshold levels under the CR treatment and 
four under the CNR treatment, in total we had 10 experimental treatments (see 
















32 1 2 13 -- --
2. ER 49.66%
(0.2979)
29 1 5 17 -- --
3 CR1 (40 pts) 44.44%
(0.3006)
32 1 4 14 5 29
4. CR2 (85 pts) 51.87%
(0.2410)
31 1 2 20 1 22
5. CR3 (120 pts) 53.32%
(0.2862)
30 0 5 18 8 16
6. CR4 (160 pts) 64.09%
(0.3050)
33 0 7 27 6 15
7. CNR1 (40 pts) 52.30%
(0.3062)
28 0 5 15 5 27
8. CNR2 (85 pts) 48.63%
(0.2933)
31 3 2 17 1 24
9. CNR3 (120 pts) 56.55%
(0.2565)
28 0 3 21 9 16
10. CNR4 (160 pts) 43.23% 
(0 .2806)




305 9 37 177 37 192
Percentage 3.0% 12.13% 58.03% 15.16% 78.69%
 
Table 1.2 Summary of Statistics 
 
First, we ran NR and ER treatments and calculated the average donation 
amounts in these two treatments. They were, respectively, 68.3 points and 99.3 
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 points out of 200 points8. We denoted them, respectively, d0 and de. Note that 
d0 captures donors' (intrinsic) motive for giving that is driven by either 
altruism or warm glow, while de captures donors' prestige and warm glow for 
giving accrued from having their exact amount of donations publicly disclosed. 
The difference between de and d0 captures the effect of prestige motive for 
giving. 
We then set the four category-threshold levels, dbi, with i ∈{1,2,3,4}, in 
the following manner. The first threshold level, db1 = 40 points, was set such 
that db1 < d0 = 68.3 points. We denoted the treatment employing this threshold 
level the CR1 plan. 
The second threshold level, db2 = 85 points, was set such that d0 = 68.3 
points < db2 < de = 99.3 points. We denoted the treatment employing this 
threshold level the CR2 plan. 
The third threshold level, db3 = 120 points, was set such that de = 99.3 points 
< db3 ≤ dm, with dm denoting the category-threshold level that would equalize 
the amount of donations solicited under the NR plan and the ER plan. Thus, 
both dm and d0 would result in the same amount of donations. Consequently, 
under the CR plan, the category threshold should never be set higher than dm. 
Unfortunately, it was difficult to pinpoint how high should dm be. We therefore 
adopted the following approach. We chose a value for db3 that was larger than 
de but that was expected to be sufficiently smaller than dm. For this reason we 
arbitrarily set db3=120 points. We denoted the treatment employing this 
threshold level the CR3 plan. 
Finally, for the fourth threshold level, db4, we chose a value that was 
substantially higher than dm and sufficiently close to the maximum endowment 
amount of 200 points. The value of db4 should in general be larger than dm. We 
                                                        
8 Each subject was given two endowments, 100 points and 200 points (see the experimental 
instructions in the Appendix). In this chapter, we focus on the decisions from the 200-point 
endowment and discuss those from the 100-point endowment in the next chapter. 
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 therefore set db4=160 points (80 percent of the total endowment), such that it 
was likely that db3 < dm < db4. We denoted the treatment employing this 
threshold level the CR4 plan. The underlying idea here is that if db4 was set too 
high for donors to follow, donors would simply ignore the category because 
the price of obtaining prestige would simply be too expensive for them. As a 
result, donors would tend to donate an amount equal to or lower than the 
amount donated under the NR plan. 
Thus, in all, db1, db2, db3, and db4 were set at, respectively, 20, 42.5, 60, and 
80 percent of donors' initial endowment. Note that the manner with which we 
set these category-threshold levels is consistent with Harbaugh (1998a). 
To make the publicity effect salient, it is important to set the category 
threshold sufficiently high so that donors who have high valuation for 
non-pecuniary prestige benefits are able to distinguish themselves from donors 
who have low valuation for these benefits. A high category threshold would 
prevent low-valuation donors from mimicking high-valuation donors by 
donating an amount that would qualify them for the category bracket. A 
high-valuation donor's prestige feeling is enhanced when he/she belongs to 
only a select few donors who qualify for the category bracket. Thus, the high 
category threshold essentially allows donors to credibly signal their reputation 
and to gain prestige from donating. 
The category effect, in contrast to the publicity effect, instead would tend to 
be salient when the category threshold is not excessively high. Donors would 
anchor their donating decision to the category threshold and give an amount 
that is in the proximity of the category threshold. It works in the same way as 
the suggested-donation scheme. When the category threshold is set too high, it 
may instead induce donors to ignore the category threshold simply because it 
requires them to donate a significantly large proportion of their initial 
endowment, unless if it allows them to obtain non-pecuniary prestige benefits 
from qualifying for the category bracket. Such prestige benefits would be 
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 present only when the category setting is complemented with public disclosure 
and an award of recognition. On the other hand, it cannot be set too low either, 
otherwise donors would ignore it in this case as well and prefer to donate an 
amount that is equal to d0. 
Provided that the category threshold is not set too low (at db1) such that 
donors would ignore the category bracket, we should expect them to be 
attracted to the category-threshold levels either because they provide subtle 
suggestion or because they provide prestige.  
3.2 Experimental Procedure 
Our experiment was conducted at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 
in Singapore. We recruited 308 undergraduate student subjects taking various 
majors ranging from Engineering, Sciences, Social Sciences, Art and Design, 
to Business. We ran one experimental treatment per session. There were 10 
sessions in total. Every subject was randomly assigned to one of these 10 
sessions, and in each session there were approximately 30 subjects. 
Upon entering the lab, subjects randomly picked a two-digit seat number, 
which was also used as their ID number for the session they were in. A seating 
plan was projected on a large screen shown in the lab for everyone to see. The 
left panel of Figure 1.1 illustrates the seating plan. 
 
Seating Plan Seating Plan (The ER Treatment) Seating Plan (The CR Treatment)
 
Figure 1.1 The Seating Plan 
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The seating plan depicted in Panel A was used for the NR and CNR 
treatments where public reporting was absent. On this seating plan, subjects' 
seat numbers were clearly indicated. Thus, although subjects were seated a 
distance apart from each other, they had a visually unobstructed view of other 
subjects and their seating arrangements. The visibility of subjects and their 
seating arrangements were crucial in enhancing the saliency of the public 
reporting (disclosure), while the sparse seating arrangements were needed to 
ensure the independency of subjects' decisions. 
When public reporting was involved, subjects were identified by their seat 
numbers. For example, in the ER treatment, when we reported the exact 
donation amount made by each subject, we showed his/her exact donation 
amount by the seat number on the projected seating plan (see the middle panel 
of Figure 1.1). In our CR treatments, we announced out loud the seat numbers 
of those subjects who had qualified for the "star donor" status. Subjects whose 
seat numbers were called out were required to stand up and wave their hands 
for all subjects to see (see the right column of Figure 1.1). 
Each subject was given an endowment of 200 points. The exchange rate 
used in the experiment was 1 Singapore dollars (or around US$0.77 at the time 
of the experiment) for every 10 points. Thus, the endowment was equivalent to 
20 Singapore dollars (or US$15). In the experiment, subjects had to make a 
simple allocation decision. They had to decide how many points out of their 
endowment to donate to a charity. The remaining points not donated would 
become their take-home earnings. 
The charity chosen as the beneficiary of the donations raised in our 
experiment was “Doctors Without Borders” (Médecins Sans Frontières), a 
secular, nongovernmental, and nonprofit charitable organization that provides 
urgent medical care and humanitarian aid to war-torn regions and to 
developing countries struck by natural disasters. A brief video clip describing 
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 the organization and their work was shown to subjects at the beginning of the 
experiment. After all subjects made their donation decision, we tallied the total 
amount of money raised in the session and donated it to the charity through its 
online donation portal. The whole donation process was transparent and 
projected on the screen for all participants to witness. We took great care in 
ensuring that subjects were fully aware of this "live" online donation process 
at the beginning of the experiment. Once the online donation process was 
successfully completed, we received an email acknowledgement from the 
charity and we showed this email to all subjects. The remaining amount of 
endowment points not donated was paid to subjects in cash at the end of the 
session. 
4. Experimental Results 
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics of donations. The final row of 
Table 1.2 depicts the aggregate patterns of donations. On average, subjects 
donated 49.75 percent (99.52 points) of their initial endowment. Only 3 
percent of subjects decided not to donate to the charity at all, and 12 percent of 
subjects decided to donate all their endowment to the charity. Approximately 
58 percent of subjects donated more than 50 percent of their endowment to the 
charity. In our experimental treatments involving the category bracket, i.e., CR 
and CNR plans, 63.52 percent of subjects donated an amount that was at least 
equal to the threshold amount. This proportion was slightly larger when 
publicity and title of recognition were present (65.08 percent under the CR 
plan) compared with when these were absent (61.86 percent under the CNR 
plan). This suggests that the twin presence of the category setting and 
publicity may have attracted subjects to donate a greater amount. 
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 4.1 The Performance of category reporting  






















NR CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4
CR vs NR























NR CNR1 CNR2 CNR 3 CNR4
CNR vs  NR






















CR1 CNR1 CR2 CNR2 CR3 CNR 3 CR4 CNR4
CR vs C NR






















ER CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4
ER vs CR
Panel D. Performance of the Exact Reporting Plan
 
Figure 1.2 The Comparison of the Average Donation Rates across Treatments 
 
The average donation rate under the NR plan was 34.15 percent. Recall that 
subjects' donation behavior under the NR plan captures their intrinsic motive 
for giving9. 
Under CR1, CR2, CR3, and CR4 plans, the average donation rates were 
respectively; 44.44, 51.90, 53.33, and 64.09 percent (see also Panel A of 
                                                        
9 It is interesting to note that the average contribution rate under the NR plan is comparable to 
that under the standard public-goods game. In particular, it is slightly lower than the average 
contribution rate found by Andreoni and Petrie (2004), which was around 30.3 percent of the 
endowment. It is very close to the average contribution rate found by Croson (1996), which 
was around 35.7 percent of the endowment, and that found by Rege and Telle (2004), which 
was around 34.4 percent of the endowment. In the absence of extrinsic motivations for giving, 




 Figure 1.2). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that the average 
donation rate under the CR1 plan was not significantly different from that 
under the NR plan. On the other hand, the average donation rates under the 
remaining CR plans (i.e. CR2, CR3, and CR4) were significantly higher than 
that under the NR plan (p-values were, respectively, 0.1543, 0.0043, 0.0030, 
and 0.0001). We thus have the following result. 
 
Result 1. In general, CR plans outperformed the NR plan, except when the 
category threshold was set at the lowest category threshold-level at db1. 
 
It is interesting to note that the result obtained from the comparison between 
the CR1 plan and the NR plan is consistent with the Harbaugh model 
(Harbaugh, 1998a,b), which predicts that the CR plan will be superior to the 
NR plan if and only if the category threshold is not set too low. The category 
threshold we set for the CR1 plan (db₁) was substantially lower than d₀, i.e., 
the average donation rate under the baseline NR plan, and this induced 
subjects to ignore the category plan. They instead preferred to donate an 
amount consistent with their intrinsic motive for giving. 
The Harbaugh model also predicts that when the category threshold is set 
too high, donors will ignore the category setting and prefer to donate an 
amount that is equal to that prevailing under the NR plan. However, our 
experimental evidence did not support this prediction. We found that the 
average donation rate under the CR4 plan was higher than that under the NR 
plan. We also found that there were more subjects who gave away all of their 
endowment and fewer subjects who gave nothing under the CR4 plan than 
under the NR plan. This suggests that subjects did not really ignore the 
category setting even when the category threshold employed was very high, i.e. 
80 percent of their endowment. Moreover, when we increase the category 
threshold under the CR plan, more subjects gave away over 50 percent of their 
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 endowment under the CR plan than under the CNR plan. 
Harbaugh attributed the superiority of the CR plan over the NR plan to the 
prestige motive for giving. However, it is not apparent whether the superiority 
arises because of the sole existence of the prestige motive for giving. This is 
because under the CR plan there are essentially two important elements that 
would positively influence subjects' incentive to donate. These are the 
category effect, which exists owing to the mere presence of the category 
setting, and the publicity effect, which exists owing to the presence of the 
public reporting and a title of recognition. The former effect acts as a donation 
anchor, while the latter acts as a channel for prestige. The interplay between 
these two effects induces subjects to donate a greater amount to the charity. 
However, it is difficult to establish how these two effects interact with each 
other simply by comparing the CR plan and the NR plan, and to clearly 
identify the existence of the prestige motive for giving. It is crucial that these 
two confounding effects are disentangled. To do this, we ran an experimental 
treatment involving the CNR plan, which is essentially equivalent to a 
donation-solicitation strategy that still utilizes the category setting, but 
removes the publicity component.  
4.2 Disentangling the Category Effect from the Publicity Effect  
The Category Effect: CNR vs NR  
We compared the CNR plan and the NR plan to identify the category effect. 
The only difference between these two treatments was the presence of a 
category setting. Donors who qualified for the category bracket would not 
have their identity be publicly disclosed nor obtain any award of status. 
The average donation rates obtained under the CNR treatments were, 
respectively, 52.32 percent (CNR1), 48.68 percent (CNR2), 56.57 percent 
(CNR3) and 43.23 percent (CNR4). Panel B of Figure 1.2 compares the 
average donation rates across CNR plans with the average donation rate under 
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 the NR plan. It can be seen that, with the exception of the CNR4 plan, the 
CNR plans resulted in significantly higher average donation rates than the NR 
plan. The p-values from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of 
means between a pair of any one of these CNR treatments and NR treatment 
were respectively; 0.0243, 0.0495, 0.0006, and 0.2164. We can thus conclude 
the following. 
 
Result 2. The category effect induced donors to give larger donations to the 
charity as long as the category-threshold level was not set excessively high at 
db4. 
 
Thus, in the absence of the publicity effect stemming from the public 
disclosure of donations and the award of honor, the mere use of the category 
setting could significantly increase donations provided that the category 
threshold was set at a low or a medium level. Essentially, this category 
threshold provided a donation anchor for donors. However, when the category 
threshold was set at an excessively high level, i.e. db4, the category setting 
alone was not sufficient to induce donors to give greater amount under the 
CNR4 plan than under the NR plan. 
Two points are noteworthy here. First, the average donation rate under 
CNR1 (52.3 percent) was significantly higher than that under NR, while that 
under CR1 presented in Result 1 was not, although the difference between the 
average donation rates under the CR1 and CNR1 plans was not significant 
(p-value was 0.3353). This suggests that, at the low category threshold, the 
combined effect of the category setting and public reporting was inferior to the 
effect of the category setting alone. This might be because of the potentially 
negative publicity effect arising from qualifying for the star donor status for 
such a low category bracket. A low category threshold under the CR plan, i.e. 
the CR1 plan, did not enable donors who value prestige highly to distinguish 
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 themselves from those who do not. In other words, it had no signaling value. 
The result showed that more donors gave an amount below the category 
threshold under the CR1 plan than under the CNR1 plan. 
The Second noteworthy point is that, the fall in donations under the CNR4 
plan, relative to those under the other three CNR plans, can also be explained 
intuitively. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.2., the category setting can be 
viewed as a non binding suggestion to donors. Compliance with it would 
simplify the decision process, but it would also come at a cost for donors in 
the form of foregone private consumption. When the category threshold is set 
excessively high at db4, the cost may outweigh the benefit resulting in a drop 
in the amount of solicited donations. Donors would have less incentive to meet 
the threshold under the CNR4 plan, particularly when doing so would bring 
them no prestige benefits. Thus, to sum up, we have the result. 
 
The Publicity Effect: CR vs CNR  
We compared CR plans and CNR plans pairwisely to identify the publicity 
effect (see also Table 1.2 and Panel C of Figure 1.2). The only difference 
between these two treatments was the presence of public disclosure of donors 
who qualified for the category bracket and the award of recognition given to 
them. The p-values from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of 
means between pairs of CR and CNR treatments sharing the same 
category-threshold level, i.e., between CR1 and CNR1 treatments, between 
CR2 and CNR2 treatments, and so on, were respectively, 0.3353, 0.6496, 
0.7580, and 0.0061. Thus, only the highest category-threshold level, db4, 
yielded significantly larger donations for the CR plan than for the CNR plan. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of the donation distributions further 
confirmed it. The donation distributions were similar for the first three 
category-threshold levels, but not for the highest category-threshold level. The 
p-values from the test were, respectively, 0.783, 0.815, 0.685, and 0.019). 
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 Using observations from CR and CNR treatments, we ran the following 
OLS regression, 
Yi = β₀+ β1Di 
publicity + β₂Di gender + β₃Di nationality + εi, 
where Yi denotes the individual's donation points allocated. Here, Di publicity 
is the dummy variable for the publicity effect which takes the value of 1 for 
CR and ER plans, and 0 for CNR and NR plans. We also controlled for the 
gender of our subjects, Di gender, (1 for female and 0 for male) and nationality, 
Di nationality, (1 for local and 0 for foreigner) in our regressions. Table 1.3 
presents the regressions results. It can be seen that the publicity dummy was 
significant only when the category-threshold level was set at db4. 
 
Dependent Variable: Donation Points
CR & CNR ER & NR


















































N 59 62 58 64 61
R-Squared 0.0395 0.2019 0.0119 0.1367 0.1104
Notes:
Robust standard error in parenthesis
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level  
Table 1.3 The Publicity Effect 
 
This result is further supported by the detailed giving patterns under CR and 
CNR shown in Table 1.2. In the CR4 treatment (with 33 subjects), 7 subjects 
gave their full endowment, and no one gave nothing. In the CNR4 treatment 
(with 31 subjects), only 2 subjects gave their full endowment and 2 subjects 
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 gave nothing. Furthermore, 15 subjects in the CR4 treatment donated an 
amount that was at least equal to the threshold amount, but only 6 subjects did 
this in the CNR4 treatment. We thus have the following result. 
 
Result 3. The publicity effect induced donors to give larger donations only 
when the category-threshold level was set sufficiently high.  
4.3 The Clustering of Donations around the Category Threshold  
We next evaluated the clustering of donations around the category threshold. 
In the presence of the category effect, clustering arose because the 
category-threshold level employed provided an anchor for donors to donate an 
amount adjacent to (i.e., below or above ) the threshold level. In the presence 
of the publicity effect, the clustering arose because the public disclosure of 
donors who qualified for the category threshold and the accompanying award 
of recognition allowed donors to obtain prestige. Consequently, donors were 
motivated to give an amount that was equal to- or just above the threshold 
level in order to obtain prestige. When both effects were present, donations 
tended to cluster around the category-threshold level employed. 
Our measure of clustering was the absolute distance of donations from the 
category-threshold level employed. This measure captured the ability of the 
category-threshold level in attracting donors to give an amount near the 
category-threshold level. A similar measure of clustering was also employed 
by Shang and Croson (2009) in their study of the impact of suggested donation 
amount on pro-social behavior. 
For each of the category-threshold level employed, we ran the following 
OLS regression, 
Yi = β₀+ β1Di 
treatment + β₂Di gender + β₃Di nationality + εi, 
where Yi denotes the absolute distance of the individual contribution from 
the category-threshold level. Here, Di treatment denotes the treatment dummy, 
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 which takes the value of 1 for the treatment that employs category setting and 
0 for the treatment that employs no category setting, Di gender and Di nationality are 
dummy variables for gender and nationality (see Table 1.4). A negative 
coefficient of the treatment dummy indicates that the distance of donations 
from the threshold amount decreased when the category setting was 
employed 10 .
Dependant Variable: The Absolute Distance of Contribution from the Category Threshold
Category1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Treatment: CR and NR









N 63 63 62 65
R-squared 0.051 0.053 0.080 0.231
Treatment: CNR and NR









N 60 63 60 63
R-squared 0.077 0.056 0.194 0.103
Treatment: CR and CNR









N 59 62 58 64
R-squared 0.057 0.023 0.019 0.112
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Robust standard error in parenthesis
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level  
Table 1.4 The Clustering Effect of Donations around the Category 
Threshold 
 
The first two rows in Table 1.4 indicate that the presence of the category 
setting (with or without publicity) attracted donors to give an amount close to 
the category-threshold level when the category-threshold levels db3 and db4 
were employed. When we compared the CR plans to the NR plan (see Row 1 
in Table 1.4), we found that the use of both db3 and db4 reduced the absolute 
                                                        
10 Obviously, under the NR plan, no category-threshold level was employed. For the purpose 
of comparison with CR and CNR plans, we evaluated donation patterns under the NR plan 
using the same category-threshold level employed under CR and CNR plans for reference. 
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 distance of donations from the threshold amounts. Under the CR plan, both the 
category effect and the publicity effect were present and contributed 
significantly to the increasing clustering tendency. The impact of db4 on 
donations was much stronger than that of db3. In particular, under db4 the 
distance of the average donation from db4 was lowered by 43 points. 
When we focused only on the category effect while controlling for the 
publicity effect, we found that only db3 significantly increased the clustering 
tendency. Specifically, the use of the category setting lowered the distance of 
the donations from db3 by approximately 28 points (see row 2 in Table 1.4). 
When we focused only on the publicity effect while controlling for the 
category effect, we found that only db4 significantly increased the clustering 
tendency. The presence of publicity and the award of recognition lowered the 
distance of the donations from db4 by approximately 33 points (see row 3 in 
Table 1.4). This result is consistent with our previous result that, when we 
controlled for the category effect, the publicity effect was salient when the 
category-threshold level was set at db4. At this very high level, donors who 
valued prestige and reputation highly were attracted to donate an amount that 
would qualify them for the category. Thus, we have the following result. 
 
Result 4. Relative to the NR plan, the CR plan induced more clustering of 
donations around the category threshold-level. This clustering of donations 
was caused by both the publicity effect and the category effect. Controlling for 
the former, the latter induced more clustering of donations when the category 
threshold-level was set at db3, while controlling for the latter, the former 
induced more clustering of donations when the category threshold-level was 
set at db4.  
4.4 The Effect of Increasing the Category-Threshold Level  
We ran the Wilcoxon--Mann--Whitney test to evaluate the within-reporting 
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 plan impact of increasing the category-threshold level. Under the CR plan, an 
increase in the category-threshold level from 40 points to either 85 points or 
120 points did not significantly increase donations (p-values were, respectively, 
0.1311 and 0.1516). It was only when the category-threshold level was 
substantially increased to 160 points that donations rose (p-value 0.0173). 
Under the CNR plan, in contrast, increasing the category-threshold level from 
40 points to the higher category-threshold levels had no influence on 
donations (p-values were, respectively, 0.8309, 0.5636, and 0.3236). 
Under the CR plan, qualifying for the category setting potentially brings 
prestige benefits to donors, in particular when the category-threshold level is 
set sufficiently high to allow donors with high valuation of prestige benefits to 
distinguish themselves from those with low valuation of prestige benefits. The 
latter would not want to mimic the action of the former by also qualifying for 
the category setting, because the cost of doing so would exceed the prestige 
benefits obtained. This explains why under the CR plan, when the 
category-threshold level was increased from 40 points to 160 points, the 
amount of solicited donations increased. In contrast, under the CNR plan the 
channel for donors to obtain prestige benefits was absent. Without prestige 
benefits, donors would not find it attractive to qualify for the category setting. 
We thus have the following result.  
 
Result 5. Increasing the category threshold-level resulted in larger donations 
under the CR plan, but not under the CNR plan.   
 
Our result contributes to the literature on the impact of suggested-donation 
schemes on donations and reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies. 
For instance, Fraser et al. (1988) found that providing suggestions to donors to 
donate US$20 yielded larger donations than suggestions to donate any amount, 
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 even if it was just a penny11. 
However, Brockner et al. (1984) in their field study did not find any 
significant difference in the amount of donations solicited between providing 
suggestions of US$1 donations and suggestions of US$5 donations. On the 
basis of our result, the effectiveness of increasing the suggested donation 
amount in generating larger donations depends on the presence of 
non-pecuniary benefits, e.g., prestige benefits, accrued from making 
donations. 
5. Conclusion  
In this study, we systematically evaluated the donation-soliciting capability of 
the category reporting (CR) plan against other reporting plans often used by 
charities, such as the no-reporting (NR) plan, the exact-reporting (ER) plan, 
and the category no-reporting (CNR) plan. In the CR plan, charities publicly 
announce individual donations according to pre-specified categories ranked by 
the size of donations. Those who donate a sum lower than the lowest threshold 
amount specified for the lowest category would not have their donations 
publicly reported. In contrast, those who donate an amount that falls within 
one of the pre-specified categories would have their donations publicly 
reported, and on top of that be awarded a title of recognition, e.g., star donor 
status. The NR plan is essentially a simple anonymous donation- solicitation 
plan. The ER plan is a solicitation plan that reports the exact amount donated 
by each donor. The CNR plan is in essence similar to the suggested-donation 
scheme. Under this plan, the charity employs a category setting similar to that 
                                                        
11 For the latter, the authors simply incorporated a simple persuasive message "even a penny 
would help" when soliciting donations from donors. This approach is perhaps more effective 
in inducing donors to donate, but not in inducing donors to give a larger donation amount. It 
explains why this solicitation strategy is inferior to the other solicitation strategy that suggests 
donors give US$20. 
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 employed under the CR plan. Donors would be awarded the star donor status, 
but no other donors would ever be aware of it, because the information would 
not be publicly disclosed. The category-threshold level employed here would 
act only as a suggested donation point to donors. 
Harbaugh (1998a,b) argues that the CR plan is potentially superior to other 
reporting plans because the CR plan induces prestige-seeking donors to donate 
a greater amount to the charity. However, under the CR plan, there are 
essentially two effects that may positively influence donors to give more to the 
charity. The first is the publicity effect, which allows donors to obtain prestige 
benefits, and the second is the category effect, which provides donors with a 
donation anchor. Without disentangling these two potentially confounding 
elements, it is difficult to establish the importance of the prestige motive in 
giving. Furthermore, understanding the separation of these two effects would 
not only shed light on the underlying mechanism behind the superiority of the 
CR plan over other reporting plans, but it may also enable us to gauge the 
extent to which each of these effects influences donors' charitable-giving 
behaviors. 
In this study, we designed a novel experiment that allowed us to disentangle 
these two effects. We showed that, when the category-threshold level is low, 
the category effect is more salient than the publicity effect; however, when 
category-threshold level is high, the reverse is true. We also showed that the 
use of the category setting would result in clustering of donations around the 
category-threshold level. In the presence of the category effect, clustering 
arises because the category-threshold level employed provides an anchor for 
donors to donate an amount adjacent to (i.e., below or above) the threshold 
level. In the presence of the publicity effect, the clustering arises because the 
public disclosure of donors who qualified for the category threshold and the 
accompanying award of recognition allow donors to obtain prestige. 
Consequently, donors would be motivated to give an amount that is equal to or 
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 just above the threshold level in order to obtain prestige. When both effects are 
present, donations tend to cluster around the category-threshold level 
employed. 
Our study may provide some implications to charities in the field. Charities 
using a CR plan or a suggestion-donation scheme typically set the 
category-threshold (or the suggested-donation) amount in an arbitrary fashion. 
Our findings suggest that, in setting the category-threshold level, charities can 
establish some reference level first by inferring the intrinsic giving amount, 
which is the amount that an average donor would give in a simple anonymous 
donation-solicitation plan. Under a CR plan, the category-threshold level 
needs to be set sufficiently above the intrinsic giving amount such that 
qualifying for the category setting and obtaining the award of status would 
give significant prestige to donors. Under a suggested-donation scheme (or 
CNR plan in our paper), the suggested amount should also be set sufficiently 
higher than the intrinsic giving amount. It should be sufficiently salient to 
provide a donation anchor to donors. It should, however, not be set too high, 
as donors would then avoid anchoring their donation amount to the suggested 
amount. 
Some caveats of our paper are necessary. First, our experimental results 
verify the existence of the publicity effect, but we could not pinpoint its source. 
It could be the pursuit of prestige, as proposed by Harbaugh's model, or the 
avoidance of shame, or social conformity (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). A donor 
might choose to respond to the category setting, particularly at the higher 
category-threshold level, simply to avoid a situation whereby everyone except 
this donor was awarded a "star donor" status. It would be interesting to 
separate and identify these different motivations for giving in the presence of 
publicity. 
Second, in our experiment we considered only one category-threshold level. 
In reality, charities employing a CR plan often use multiple category-threshold 
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 levels. The higher the category, the more prestigious the status awarded to 
donors who qualify for the category. It would therefore be interesting to 
extend our experimental analysis to the case of multiple category-threshold 
levels. 
6. Appendix 
6.1 The Seating Plan and Disclosure Methods 
Participants were randomly assigned to treatments, and randomly seated 
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Please do not open the 
envelope on the chair in front 
of you.
 
Figure 1.A1 The Seating Map  
 
In ER treatment, after all donations were made, we projected on the screen 
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Figure 1.A2 The Seating Plan of ER 
 
 
In CR treatments (CR1, CR2, CR3, and CR4), after all donations were 
made, we projected on the screen the following seating map and the 
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Figure 1.A3 The Seating Plan of CR 
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6.2 The Online Donation Process 










The Online donation was made in HongKong dollar through MSF Hong Kong 
office. 
 
Figure 1.A4 The Screen Shot of MSF Hong Kong Website 
 
We use the following website to find out the exchange rate between Singapore 
Dollars (SGD) and Hong Kong Dollars (HKD). 
  http://www.oanda.com  
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 The following screenshots show two samples of confirmation email from 
Doctors without Borders that we received immediately after credit card online 








 6.3 Experimental Instructions 
Instructions for the NR treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment.  
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donation all of you in this session have made and 
will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will witness 
the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the contribution. 
We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders on the screen in 
front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
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 determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 




The amount you donate will not be made known to other participants. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 




 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 
School/ Division: _________   Study Year: __________________ 
 
 
The amount you donate will not be made known to other participants. 
 
 
Given the two endowments points allocated to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 




 Instructions for the ER treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 






You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment.  
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
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 100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 






After all participants in this session made their donation decision, we 
will announce the exact amount of donation that each participant (by 
the ID number) has made.           
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 




After all participants in this session have made their donation decision, we 
will announce the exact amount of donation that each participant (by the 
seat number) has made. 
 
 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 










Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
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 100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 









We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.              
If the amount you donate is no less than 20_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 40_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 










We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 20_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 40_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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 Instructions for the CR2 treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
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 100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 










We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.              
If the amount you donate is no less than 35_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 85_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 










We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 35_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 85_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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 Instructions for the CR3 treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
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 100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 











We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
If the amount you donate is no less than 60_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 120_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 










We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 60_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 120_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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 Instructions for the CR4 treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 
sheet, and a claim card. Please check it now!  
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 Specific Instructions 
 
You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
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 number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 










We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
If the amount you donate is no less than 80_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 160_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 









We will publicly acknowledge those of you who qualify for the “STAR 
DONOR” status (by your seat numbers) after every participant has made 
their donation decisions.               
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 80_points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 160_points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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 Instructions for the CNR1 treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
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 determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 










We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
If the amount you donate is no less than 20 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 40 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 




 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 









We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
If the amount you donate is no less than 20 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 40 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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 Instructions for the CNR2 treatment 
 




Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
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 determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 










We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
If the amount you donate is no less than 35 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 85 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 









We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 35 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 85 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
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 determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 










We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
If the amount you donate is no less than 60 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 120 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
 70
 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 










We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
 
If the amount you donate is no less than 60 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 120 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 
as you will need it to claim your compensation. Wait for further 
instruction. 
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Greetings! Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last 
about 45 minutes. You are strictly not allowed to communicate with each 
other throughout this study. You will receive compensation for your 
participation, whose magnitude depends on the decision you make in the study. 
The compensation will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the 
study. 
 
Each of you has been randomly assigned an ID number. This ID number is 
stated on the envelope in front of you. Throughout the study, we will strictly 
only identify you with this ID number. Your personal identity will not be 
known to other participants and to administrators. Thus, the decision you 
made will be done in an ‘anonymous’ fashion.  
 
In the envelope, you will find an instruction sheet, an allocation decision 





You are given an endowment with two possible values of 100 points and 200 
points. At the same time, you get to know an international charitable 
organization called “Doctors without Borders” (“Médecines sans 
Frontières”). This is a secular non-governmental and nonprofit charitable 
organization that provides urgent medical care and humanitarian aids to many 
developing countries experiencing natural disasters and war torn regions (you 
will learn more about it later). Now you are facing this decision: out of your 
given endowment, how much you are willing to donate to the cause and 
how much you are going to keep for yourself. You can donate any integer 
amount of points (no decimal) ranging from 0 point up to your given total 
endowment. 
 
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of donations all of you in this session have made 
and will donate this total amount online through the internet. You will 
witness the whole process of donation, and it is you who make the 
contribution. We will show the confirmation from Doctors without Borders 
on the screen in front of you as soon as we get it.   
 
The amount you decided to keep for yourself will be given to you in cash 
at the end of this study. Since there are two possible levels of endowments 
(100 points and 200 points), we need to determine which one of these will be 
the binding endowment.  
 
For this purpose, one of you will be randomly chosen to throw a dice to 
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 determine the binding endowment. If an even number comes up on the dice, 
100 points will be selected as your binding endowment; otherwise if an odd 
number comes up on the dice, 200 points will be selected as your binding 
endowment. The points you donate and the points you decide to keep for 
yourself will then be converted into S$ cash equivalent, with the 









We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.     
If the amount you donate is no less than 80 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 160 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
 
 
After you have made your allocation decision, there is a survey for you to 
complete. Once the survey is done, your compensation will be paid to you in 
private and individually.  
 
Please raise your hands if you have questions about the procedures of this 
session and we will attend to you in private. At this point, if you wish not to 
participate in this study, you may leave the room now. 
 
Before we proceed further, let us first watch a video clip depicting “Doctors 
without Borders”. 
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 Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________     Seat Number: _________________ 
 
Gender: _________________  Nationality: __________________ 
 










We will keep a record of your status (STAR DONOR or not), but this 
record is confidential and will not be revealed to anyone else.    
If the amount you donate is no less than 80 points when your endowment 
is 100 points, or is no less than 160 points when your endowment is 200 
points, you will be recognized as our “STAR DONOR”. 
Given the two endowments points given to you (100 points and 200 points), 
please decide how much you will donate to “Doctors without Borders” and 
how much you will keep for yourself. You can donate any integer amount of 




Endowment Donate Keep 
1 100 points   
2 200 points   
 
If you have completed the allocation decision sheet, please fill in the claim 
card accordingly. Place your allocation decision sheet together with the 
instruction sheet inside the envelope provided. Keep the claim card with you, 









Recent studies show that image concern is a major motive for people's 
pro-social behaviors (Soetevent, 2005; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). In this 
paper, we present an experimental study on gender differences in image 
concern in charitable giving. Gender differences in generosity have been of 
interest to social scientists for a few decades. Early studies in psychology and 
sociology led to a conventional wisdom that women are generally more 
socially oriented than men (Eckel and Grossman, 1998). Economists, however, 
have not yet reached a general consensus as to which gender is more generous. 
Many rigorous laboratory experiments with real monetary incentives have 
produced inconsistent results, even in a simple dictator game or an ultimatum 
game setting. Some researchers have found that women are more generous 
(Eckel and Grossman, 1998), while others have found no evidence of gender 
differences in generosity (Bolton and Katok, 1995; Solnick, 2001; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2001). 
Although the evidence of gender differences in generosity is inconclusive, 
researchers have come to realize that generosity, instead of being a static 
attribute for each gender, tends to be environment-dependent and 
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 context-sensitive (Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006). In their survey paper, 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide evidence that women are more responsive 
than men to the social context surrounding the experiments. In particular, 
women's generous behavior is more sensitive to the level of anonymity of their 
decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Bolton and Katok, 1995), to the gender 
of the recipients (Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Houser and Schunk, 2009), and to the 
identity of the recipients (Ben-Ner et al., 2004), and to the repetitive procedure 
of a game (Ortmann and Tichy, 1999). Della Vigna et al. (2013) in a field 
study of door-to-door fund-raising campaign also find that women are more 
responsive to a simple avoidance strategy. In other words, a higher proportion 
of women donors would avoid the fundraiser if they have a chance to do so. 
On the other hand, men are found to be more sensitive than women to some 
other situations. Croson et al. (2010) found in a field survey that, compared to 
women, men are more influenced by social norms in their donation decisions, 
and this result was confirmed in a later laboratory experiment. Similarly, in a 
laboratory experiment, Pan and Houser (2011) found that men are more 
sensitive than women to displayable rewards when competing for generosity. 
The role as an individual or a group representative has also been shown to 
have a stronger influence on men than on women in their giving decisions 
(Song et al., 2005). Furthermore, there are inconsistent results on how genders 
respond to the cost of altruism: Andreoni and Vesterland (2001) found that, 
given a certain budget, men's altruism is more sensitive to price changes, 
while Cox and Deck (2006) found the opposite. 
Among the various factors that affect giving behaviors of men and women, 
publicity of donor pro-social behavior has not received due attention. However, 
studies have shown that such publicity may have a significant impact on 
individual giving behavior: It could substantially increase average 
contributions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004). One possible 
reason is that donors might have a taste for positive social image, and 
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 publicizing one's pro-social behavior would cater for such preferences. 
Differences in social preferences between genders might lead to differences in 
responses between men and women to the use of publicity in a charitable 
donation solicitation campaign. This issue, to the best of our knowledge, has 
not been addressed in the literature. 
To explore this topic, we conducted a charity experiment with a fundraising 
strategy known as "category reporting." Using "category reporting," a charity 
pre-specifies one or several category brackets, each with a threshold amount 
and a title of recognition (e.g. a star donor status). Only donors whose 
donations meet or exceed the threshold will be publicly acknowledged at that 
category level by the charity. Based on this practice, we introduced two 
treatment effects in the experiment: the category level and the publicity 
channel. We varied the category level to control for the potential image 
benefits, and we turned on or off the publicity channel to isolate the effect of 
publicity at each category level. We observed the donation decisions of men 
and women in these donation scenarios of different image benefits, and we 
inferred the gender differences in their image preferences. 
We found men gave much more than women when the generous giving 
behavior could be known to others, and they gave much less than women 
when such behavior remained private. Furthermore, men had a higher 
probability than women to qualify for the category, especially when publicity 
is associated with a high category level. Such gender differences could be 
credited to the fact that men's giving was sensitive to category setting and 
public reporting, while women's were not. Women's average donations varied 
little with the category level or the publicity channel. This study not only 
verifies the image incentive in charitable giving (Harbaugh 1998a; Benabou 
and Tirole, 2006), but also provides evidence of heterogeneity of image 
preferences between genders: Compared to women, men value a generous 
image and conform more to the profile of "image-seeker" in pro-social 
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 behaviors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly 
discusses the literature that motivated our study. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the main results. 
Section 5 discusses these results and concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
Charitable giving is common in social life. Individuals can often be seen 
giving up part of their hard-earned money to improve the welfare of others. 
Interestingly, being a generous donor does not mean one is irrational 
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007). As with economic decisions, 
charitable giving involves costs and benefits. The costs of giving may be in the 
form of forgone private consumptions that could have been enjoyed had the 
person not made the donation. On the other hand, the benefits of giving are 
multifaceted and are related to various intrinsic, extrinsic, and image 
motivations (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009). 
Intrinsic motivation refers to the direct benefits obtained from the act of 
giving itself, such as altruism (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom et al., 
1986) and warm-glow (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Extrinsic motivation refers to 
the material benefits of giving, such as tax deduction, displayable gifts from 
the charity, or reward from a charity lottery. In this paper, we do not consider 
this type of motivation. Finally, image motivation refers to the non-pecuniary 
benefits received by an individual as a result of having a positive social image 
accrued through the act of giving. These non-pecuniary benefits may include 
pro-social image (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009), social 
approval (Hollander, 1990), income signaling (Glazer and Konrad, 1996), and 
prestige (Harbaugh, 1998a). It is important to note that image motivation is 
only activated via a publicity channel through which individuals' donations 
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 can be made known to others. 
The effect of publicity on giving and cooperation has been well documented 
in economic experiments and field studies. Soetevent (2005) found in Dutch 
churches that a non-anonymous collection method can increase total 
contributions for charitable causes. In a standard dictator game, Charness and 
Gneezy (2008) found that revealing the names of subjects significantly 
increases their giving amount. Their results are in line with the previous 
findings of Hoffman et al. (1994), Frey and Bohnet (1997), and Bolton et al. 
(1998) showing that increasing the degree of anonymity of donations results in 
lower pro-social contributions. Using public-goods games, Andreoni and 
Petrie (2004) and Rege and Telle (2004) found in their experiments that 
revealing subjects' identities together with their contribution amounts 
substantially increases total donations. Contribution decision has also been 
shown to be sensitive to the manner in which subjects' identities are publicly 
disclosed. In particular, the increase in contributions was higher in Rege and 
Telle's (2004) study, in which subjects' identities were revealed by inviting 
them on stage for everybody to see when collecting their payment for 
participating in the experiment, compared to the contributions in Andreoni and 
Petrie's (2004) study, in which subjects' identities were revealed by showing 
their photographs on computer screens. 
These experimental findings are consistent with the image motivated 
pro-social behavior model of Benabou and Tirole (2006). One of the features 
of this model is a consideration of individuals' heterogeneity in altruism and 
image concerns. They comment: "...when agents are heterogeneous in their 
reputational concerns, giving greater scrutiny to their behavior may not work 
that well." Such concern is not unwarranted. Individuals with different 
backgrounds, income levels, education levels, and social groups may value 
image benefits differently. In particular, differences in image concerns may 
even exist between the two major social groups of human society: man and 
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 woman. Studies have shown that heterogeneity does exist between genders in 
many other areas such as risk preferences, social preferences, and attitudes 
towards competition (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009). If it is also true for 
image preferences, men's and women's giving behaviors should respond 
differently to the publicity channel. As a result, the donation soliciting effect 
of publicity prevailing in many charitable campaigns should also differ 
between genders. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
experimental evidence on the heterogeneity of image preferences among 
individuals. In particular, gender differences in image preferences and the 
implication of them to charitable giving have not been clearly addressed. Our 
study aimed to fill this gap. 
This study went beyond previous research on the publicity effect in that we 
manipulated the level of image benefits to donors and focused on how the 
impact varies across genders. Instead of simply revealing the exact giving 
amount, we conducted publicity through category reporting. Category 
reporting is a donation soliciting strategy commonly used by charities in the 
field. It was formally analyzed in Harbaugh's (1998a) model of prestige. 
According to Harbaugh, category reporting should yield more donations 
compared to anonymous donation drives because category reporting provides 
extra prestige benefits to donors in addition to the intrinsic warm-glow 
benefits they gain through the act of giving. Using category reporting, the 
charity acknowledges to the public each individual's donation according to the 
pre-specified categories. Donors who give more will be attached to a higher 
category, and donors who give less will be attached to a lower category. 
Usually, the higher the category to which the donor belongs, the higher the 
image benefits the donor would reap. By varying the level of category, we can 
control for the level of image benefits a donor can obtain by giving above the 
category threshold amount when publicity is available. 
There are some related studies to ours. Charness and Rustichini (2011) 
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 show that the effect of peer observation on social behavior varies across 
genders. In their prisoner's dilemma game, men cooperated less often and 
women cooperated more often when observed by same-gender peers. This 
phenomenon could be explained by the different signals that men and women 
want to send to their in-group peers in an attempt to gain social approval. 
These signals differ across genders because the notion of what constitute to be 
socially desirable actions differs across genders. 
In a controlled laboratory experiment of the public-goods game, Pan and 
Houser (2011) found evidence that unique and displayable rewards, i.e. a mug 
featuring the insignia of the university where subjects are studying, trigger 
men to contribute more than women. In other words, men would compete on 
generosity in order to obtain the unique and displayable rewards which might 
bring them image benefits in the real world outside the laboratory, e.g. the 
signaling values of being publicly seen as a university student. Our study 
differed from that of Pan and Houser (2011) in that in our study the image 
benefits were gained through the publicity of individuals' generous behavior 
within the laboratory to all subjects. By varying the category threshold amount, 
we were able to manipulate the level of image benefits that could be obtained 
through publicity in the donation game. Furthermore, we removed the 
public-goods benefits in the donation game, i.e., the extrinsic motivations, and 
left only with the intrinsic motivations and image motivations for individuals 
to make donation decisions. By doing so, we were able to focus mainly on the 
non-pecuniary motivations in individuals' giving preferences. 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment was carried out at Nanyang Technological University in 
Singapore. Participants were recruited from the university's undergraduates 
through bulletin boards, mailing lists, campus-wide posters, and in-class 
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 announcements. Each participant was randomly assigned one of the four 
treatments12. 
Upon entering the laboratory, each participant randomly picked an ID 
number. A seating plan arranged by ID number was projected onto an 
overhead projector at the front of the laboratory. The participants were seated 
apart from each other and were able to see one another without visual 
obstructions. By using this setting, the intention was to keep the impact of 
publicity prominent while simultaneously maintaining the independence of 
each participant's decision. 
Prior to deciding, each participant received an endowment of 100 points. 
With this endowment, they then decided how much of it they wanted to donate 
to charity. They kept the remainder as their private payoff from participating in 
the study. The conversion rate was 10 points for 1 Singapore dollar. At the end 
of each session, the donations from each participant were added up and 
donated to the beneficiary by internet transfer, witnessed by all participants in 
the same session. The amounts the participants decided to keep were then paid 
to them in private. 
The beneficiary of this donation game was Doctors without Borders, a 
secular, non-governmental and non-profit charitable organization that provides 
urgent medical care and humanitarian aid to war-torn areas and developing 
countries struck by natural disasters. Two video clips were shown to the 
participants to provide background information on this organization and their 
work in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Participants were 
informed that the donation nature of the study was real. 
To test the impact of publicity on individuals' donation decisions, we 
introduced two treatment effects into the experiment. The first was category 
                                                        
12 We use the data of relevant treatments from Chapter 1 in this chapter. In particular, we 
focus on four treatments, namely CR1, CR4, CNR1 and CNR4 and decisions from the 
100-point endowment. All treatments were run separately and independently. 
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 setting. For each treatment, we set a category threshold, and anyone whose 
donations met or exceeded the threshold amount was recognized as a "star 
donor." In low-category treatments the threshold was set at 20 points, while in 
high-category treatments the threshold was set at 80 points. The second 
treatment effect we introduced was publicity. In publicity treatments, the star 
donor list was announced publicly. Participants whose IDs were called raised 
one hand to signal their positions for everyone else in the laboratory to see. In 
the no-publicity treatments, the donation decisions and the star donor list were 
kept confidential. Table 2.1 shows the four treatments from this 2×2 
between-subjects design: category reporting with a low threshold (CR_L), 
category reporting with a high threshold (CR_H), category no-reporting with a 
low threshold (CNR_L), and category no-reporting with a high threshold 
(CNR_H). Under the category no-reporting, a category threshold was also 
employed, however the information on who qualified for the category 
threshold was not publicly disclosed.  
 
 Publicity No publicity 
   
Low category (20 points) Category Reporting_Low (CR_L) Category No Reporting_Low (CNR_L) 
   
High category (80 points) Category Reporting_High (CR_H) Category No Reporting_High (CNR_H) 
   
 
Table 2.1 The 2×2 Experimental Design 
 
When the category threshold is low, it is easier to give an amount above the 
threshold. Individuals may do so simply because of a warm-glow motivation 
even when there is no publicity (CNR_L). If this is true, when publicity is 
present (CR_L), being known as a low-category-threshold star donor should 
add little to one's prestige benefits (Harbaugh, 1998a). However, a failure to 
give the threshold amount may bring about a negative social image, 
particularly if the majorities are able to achieve the threshold. Thus, image 
concerns should always motivate individuals to give an amount above the 
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 threshold even when the threshold is low when there is publicity, except for 
those who strongly prefer private consumption and care little about social 
image. 
On the other hand, when the category threshold is high, a large amount of 
private consumption must be sacrificed in order to be a star donor. 
Consequently, only donors who are highly altruism or who have sufficiently 
high valuation for the social image would be willing to do that. However, 
given the fact that the average giving in a dictator game is 20% of the 
endowment, the high category setting can be reasonably assumed far above 
one's altruistic giving amount (Camerer, 2003). As a result, the only concern is 
the image benefits. Without publicity (CNR_H), social image is irrelevant. 
The participants have no obligation to respond to the threshold amount, and 
their donations are mainly determined by warm-glow motivation. However, 
when publicity is present (CR_H) it activates an extra image motivation for 
individuals to give. Those who have strong preferences for being known as 
generous would trade their private consumptions for the donations in order to 
obtain this label. In contrast, those who do not have sufficiently strong 
preferences for being known as generous would not be willing to do that. We 
can therefore isolate the image-seeking donors from the rest in treatment 
CR_H where publicity relates to high category. 
4. Experimental Results 
We examine the experimental results from two angles. First, we evaluate the 
impact of publicity on average donations for men and women at different 
category levels. Second, we estimate the impact of publicity on the probability 
for a man or a woman to qualify for the threshold in order to obtain the star 
donor status under different category levels. The choice of being a star donor 
reveals an individual's preferences for social image. 
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 4.1 On Donation Amounts 
Table 2.2 summarizes the statistics. In total, we have 124 subjects, of which 71 
(57.26%) are women and 53 (42.74%) are men.  
 
Treatment  Average Donations p value 
Code Description  Total Woman Man MW test1 KS test2 
        
CR_L Category Reporting 








        
CR_H Category Reporting 








        
CNR_L Category No Reporting 








        
CNR_H Category No Reporting 








        








***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
1Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
2Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution function  
Table 2.2 Summary of Statistics 
 
From Table 2.2, we can see that the average donations from all treatments 
are 52.55 points for men and 50.15 points for women and that they are not 
significantly different from each other13. Thus, at the aggregate level we did 
not find any gender differences in generosity. This is understandable given that 
it is a result of averaging various treatment effects for both men and women. 
We therefore need to disentangle these effects. We do this in the subsequent 
parts of this section. Figure 2.1 illustrates the average donations of men and 
                                                        
13 Both parametric two-sample t-test (p = 0.6852) and nonparametric Mann--Whitney ranking 
test (p = 0.7990) indicate that the difference in means is insignificant. Furthermore, 
two-sample Kolmogorov--Smirnov test (p = 0.552) shows that the distributions of the pooled 
data are not significantly different between genders. 
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Figure 2.1 Average Donation Points 
 
In addition to the statistical results, we evaluate the effects of publicity and 
category threshold on individuals' giving decisions using regression models, 
where we also consider the interaction effects of the independent variables. 
The regression model is 
 
 responsei = β1 + β₂genderi+ β₃categoryi + β₄publicityi  
+ β₅(genderi×categoryi) + β₆(genderi×publicityi)  
+ β₇(categoryi×publicityi) + β₈(genderi×categoryi×publicityi)  
+ β₉nationalityi + εi, 
 
where gender = 1 if the subject is woman, and 0 otherwise; category = 1 if 
the category level is high, and 0 otherwise; publicity = 1 if the star donor list is 
publicly announced, and 0 otherwise; and nationality = 1 if the subject is a 
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 local (Singaporean), and 0 otherwise. 
The response variables are either donation points or the star donor status 
that each subject obtains under different treatments. We focus on donation 
points in this sub-section and star donor probability in the next sub-section. 
For donation points, we estimate both ordinary least squares (OLS) and the 
Tobit model with an upper limit of 100 points. These two regressions yield 
similar results (Table 2.3), and our analysis focuses on the OLS model.  
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***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Regressions are estimated with robust s tandard errors,  given in parentheses. 
The Probit model is censored from above, at the upper limit of 100 donation points. 
 
   
Table 2.3 Regression Results 
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 4.1.1 Between-Gender Analysis 
From Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2, we observe that in CR_L, where the category 
is low and publicity is available, the average donations of men are 41.07 
points and those of women are 48.44 points. Gender differences in average 
donations are not significant in this treatment (p = 0.9231)14. Similarly, in 
CNR_L with low category level and no publicity, gender differences in 
average donations are not significant (52.5 points for men, 49.45 points for 
women, and p = 0.9589). However, when we raise the category level, publicity 
has a different impact on men and women. In CR_H, where the category level 
is high and the star donor list is publicized, the average donations of men are 
76.32 points and those of women are 48.93 points. Men's donations are 
significantly higher than women's (p = 0.0034). While in CNR_H, where 
generous givers will not be announced and giving more cannot add to one's 
image benefits, men's average donations are much smaller than women's 
(28.33 points for men, 53.42 points for women, and p = 0.0159). 
Regression yields the same results. Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the effect 
of gender on giving amounts in each treatment, which is estimated by the 
linear combination of relevant coefficients. In particular, the negative and 
significant coefficient of CR_H implies that, on average, men give 27.42 
points more than women in this treatment (see the third column). Similarly, the 
positive and significant coefficient of CNR_H implies that, on average, 
women give 22.06 points more than men in this treatment. Treatments CR_L 
and CNR_L do not exhibit gender differences, which echo the results from the 
Mann-Whitney tests.  
 
                                                        
14 The p-value refers to that from the Mann--Whitney test. 
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 A. Publicity Effects on Donation Points B. Publicity Effects on Star Donor Probability 
Treatment Woman Man 
Gender 
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Notes:  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, given in parentheses. 
Coefficients (ß) in the treatment column are those of the publicity effect on gender differences in each treatment. Coefficients of 
the publicity effect on female and male in each treatment are not listed here for simplicity. 
  
Table 2.4 Between-Gender Treatment Effects 
 
The above analysis leads to the first result of this study on the impact of 
publicity on giving amounts across genders.  
 
Result 1. There are no gender differences in giving amount when the category 
threshold is low. However, when the category threshold is high, men give more 
generously than women when publicity is available, whereas they give much 
less than women when publicity is not available. 
 
4.1.2 Within-Gender Analysis 
Within-gender analysis focuses on how a particular gender responds to the 
publicity channel at each category level. When the category threshold is low, 
the impact of publicity on giving can be observed by comparing CR_L and 
CNR_L. Likewise, CR_H and CNR_H are compared for publicity effect at the 
high category level. 
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 From Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 we can see that in general publicity does not 
change women's donation decisions for both low category and high category. 
In particular, women give 48.44 points in CR_L and 49.45 points in CNR_L, 
and 48.93 points in CR_H and 53.42 points in CNR_H. Table 2.5 presents the 
p-values from Mann-Whitney tests for within-gender analysis.  
 
 Man 
Woman CR_L CR_H CNR_L CNR_H 
     
CR_L  0.0019** 0.8086  
     
CR_H 0.7589   0.0014**
     
CNR_L 0.8363   0.0654* 
     
CNR_H  0.8378 0.6180  
     
Notes:  
The table entries are the p-values from the 
Mann-Whitney test. Comparisons above the main 
diagonal are for man, and those below the main 
diagonal are for woman. The two treatments being 
compared are given by the row and column headings. 
For instance, the p-value of 0.7589 is for the 
comparison between CR_H and CR_L for woman and 
the p-value of 0.0019 is for the comparison between 
CR_H and CR_L for man.       
 
Table 2.5 Within-Gender Treatment Effects (Mann-Whitney Tests) 
 
From Table 2.5 we observe that the differences in women's donations 
between CR_L and CNR_L are not significant (p = 0.8363) and between 
CR_H and CNR_H are also not significant (p = 0.8378). Regression results 
also verify that there are no significant publicity effects on women for both 
category levels: Coefficients of the publicity effect are not significant for both 
low and high category levels (see the third column of Table 2.6). Women's 
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 giving is stable and is not influenced by the publicity on giving behavior, 
regardless of the category level. 
As for men, when the category threshold is low, their average donations 
change little by publicity (41.07 points in CR_L, 52.5 points in CNR_L, see 
Table 2.2), and this difference in average donations is not significant (p = 
0.8086, see Table 2.5). A different picture emerges at a high category level. 
Men donate much more when publicity is available than when it is not 
available, and the difference in average donations is highly significant (76.31 
points in CR_H, 28.33 points in CNR_H, see Table 2.2; and p = 0.0014, see 
Table 2.5). The coefficient of publicity effect with high category on men is 
positive and significant, while that with low category on men is negative and 
insignificant (see the third column of Table 2.6).  
 
 
  Donation Points Star Donor Probability 










      
Publicity effect with  
low category on woman 









      
Publicity effect with  
high category on woman 
CR_H vs CNR_H 








      
Publicity effect with  
low category on man 









      
Publicity effect with  
high category on man 









      
Notes:  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
OLS and Probit Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, given in parentheses. 
Coefficients (β) in the treatment column are those of the effects mentioned in the same row. 
 
Table 2.6 Within-Gender treatment Effects (Regression Analysis) 
 
Result 2. The introduction of publicity has no effect on women regardless of 
the category threshold levels, nor does it have any effect on men when the 
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 category threshold is low. However, at a high category level, publicity on 
giving substantially increases men's average donations. 
 
4.2 On Star Donor Probability 
A participant who gives above the threshold amount is named as a "star 
donor." When publicity is available, participants' star donor status will be 
known to other participants, and when publicity is not available the status 
remains private. The publicity effect on the incentive for individuals to obtain 
a star donor status is captured by the comparisons between CR treatments and 
CNR treatments at the same category level. We use probit regression to 
evaluate the likelihood for men and women to be star donors. The response 
variable is binary: 1 if the subject is a star donor, and 0 if not. Estimation 
results are reported in Table 2.3, together with the estimation results from an 
OLS regression as the robustness check. 
We infer the effect of publicity on the propensity of donors to obtain a star 
donor status through a linear combination of the coefficients of regressors. We 
calculate the predicted probability for men and women to be star donors in 
each treatment. The predicted probability can be computed by taking the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function of X′β. Note that X 
includes all relevant regressors, and β  is a vector of the estimated 
coefficients of these regressors. 
4.2.1 Between-Gender Analysis 
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows gender differences in the propensity to become a 
star donor in each treatment. For low-category treatments, both CR_L and 
CNR_L have positive and significant effects (at the 1% significance level) on 
the star donor probability for men and women (see the first and third columns, 
respectively, of Panel B). The coefficients of gender differences for these two 
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 treatments (see the fifth column of Panel B) are negative and significant (at the 
1% significance level). This suggests that men have a higher probability than 
women of being star donors. The sixth column of Panel B of Table 2.4 shows 
that in treatment CR_L, the probability for a man to become a star donor is 
11.17% higher than it is for a woman. In treatment CNR_L, it is 15.05% 
higher. 
Similarly, in the high-category treatments, we see that CR_H has a 
significant and negative effect (at the 5% significance level) on women's 
probability of being a star donor, while its effect on men is positive and 
insignificant (at the 5% significance level). If we combine these two effects, 
men have a significantly higher probability (approximately 43.53%) than 
women of becoming a star donor in this treatment. A comparison between 
CR_H and CR_L shows that the higher category level decreases the 
probability of a subject becoming a star donor for both men and women, but 
this negative effect is much stronger for women. Publicity with high category 
discourages women from becoming star donors relative to men. CNR_H, on 
the other hand, has a significant and negative effect (at the 5% significance 
level) on men's probability of becoming a star donor, whereas its negative 
effect on women is insignificant. This implies that a high category level 
without extra image benefits significantly discourages men from qualifying for 
the category, whereas its effect on women is moderate. 
 
Result 3. In general, the probability of men becoming star donors is higher 
than that of women except when there is no publicity for generous giving. The 
star donor probability is particularly higher for men than women when there 
is publicity at a high category level. 
 
 94
 4.2.2 Within-Gender Analysis 
Table 2.6 (the fourth to the sixth column) also shows how publicity affects a 
particular gender's choice to became a star donor at each category level. We 
evaluate this effect by comparing two treatments, conditional on the same 
category level. We see that for women, regardless of the category level, the 
introduction of publicity does not change their decisions on whether or not to 
be a star donor (see the fourth column of Table 2.6). Interestingly, for men, the 
presence of publicity does not affect the probability of being a star donor when 
the category level is low, but not when the category level is high. It can be 
seen that publicity has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
men becoming star donors when category is high (see the fourth column). In 
particular, it increases the probability of men becoming star donors by 41.24%. 
Men choose to give above the threshold level when the category threshold is 
high and there is a publicity channel to make their generous giving known to 
others. 
 
Result 4. Publicity does not affect the probability of women becoming a star 
donor. However, it significantly increases men's probability of giving above the 




In this paper, we examine gender differences in image preferences in a real 
charity experiment. We innovatively make use of a popular fundraising 
strategy known as "category reporting". By category reporting, donors whose 
giving meets or exceeds a specified threshold amount would be publicly 
acknowledged and given a star donor status. Based on this practice, we 
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 introduce two treatment effects in the experiment: the category level and the 
publicity channel. The resultant four treatments provide different motivations 
for giving. 
We find that men's giving behavior is sensitive to category setting and 
public reporting. In particular, when the category level is high, men give much 
more when publicity is available compared to when it is not available. 
However, women's giving is stable regardless of the presence of the publicity 
channel. Furthermore, we find that men have a higher probability than women 
of qualifying for the category. This probability is particularly high given the 
twin presence of high category and publicity. 
The result shows that, when there is a channel to make one's generous 
giving known to others, men would choose to give more to enter the 
publicized category compared to when there are no such chances, or compared 
to women in the same situation. This suggests that men value having a positive 
social image more than women and they are willing to pursue it even at a high 
cost of private consumption. 
How can we explain this phenomenon? In their seminal paper, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) argue that identity enters the utility function and influences the 
actions taken. Gender is one of the fundamental identities of an individual and 
thus has a strong implication for the prescriptions of behaviors. In a 
male-dominant society such as today's, men are expected to take more 
responsibility for social welfare. This expectation causes men to place a 
greater value on being known as pro-social. Taking actions to build a generous 
name is one of the ways to conform to a social identity. Along the same lines, 
Charness and Rustichini (2011) propose that, in order to gain social approval, 
genders take different preferred actions to signal their identity. Note that, in 
CR_H, a positive social image is obtained at a high cost of private 
consumption. Only when greater values are attached to this image is the 
trade-off worthwhile, and this is exactly the case for the male gender. In 
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 contrast, we find that women are consistent in their generosity. Their donation 
decisions do not change with ulterior stimulus. One possibility is that women 
have a strong intrinsic warm-glow altruistic motive in charitable giving. The 
interior motive is relatively more stable and sincere, and thus women are 
immune to the influences of institutional settings such as category reporting. 
The result of this study is of both academic and practical interest. First, this 
is one of the first studies to provide experimental evidence of the 
heterogeneity of image preferences (also see Gneezy et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the understanding of gender differences 
in generosity by revealing one more factor that influences men and women in 
different ways. We show that men are more sensitive to publicity in giving and 
would give more when generous giving would be revealed to the public. This 
therefore has practical implications for the charity industry. Thus far, many 
charities that use category reporting do not differentiate its application 
between genders. Our result suggests that, given the different responsiveness 
between men and women to the same practice, a gender-specified strategy 
may be more cost-effective. 
One last note is that, although it is true that publicity brings image benefits, 
we cannot clearly identify whether the underlying motivation is "pursuit of 
prestige" or "avoidance of stigma" or both when donors respond to the 
threshold and give above it when publicity is available. It may be that giving 
above a low threshold in publicity treatments is simply done out of avoidance 
of stigma. This is because, although it is less of a challenge to give above a 
small threshold, it would be a great shame if one fails to do so. In contrast, 
giving above a high threshold calls for substantial generosity. Those who 
would not do so without publicity but choose to do so with publicity are in 
pursuit of prestige benefits to compensate for the material loss. However, our 





Punishing the "Wrongdoer" or Compensating 
the "Victim": An Experiment 
 
1. Introduction 
When distributive injustice is inflicted by one person on another, how does an 
unaffected third party respond? A utility maximizing and rational third party 
would simply do nothing, because she would only bear the cost without 
reaping any direct benefit from it. Experimental evidence from third-party 
games, however, tells us otherwise. It is widely documented that a third party 
facing such a situation would be willing to punish the violator, even at some 
personal cost (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006, Coffman 2011; 
Kurzban et al., 2007; Marlowe et al., 2008). 
Other than punishing the violator, the third party can help the victim 
directly by making a monetary transfer to them. Punishment acts as a deterrent 
against committing further injustice. Compensation, on the other hand, acts as 
an income smoothing remedy for the victim. Punishment would not directly 
improve the well-being of the victim, but compensation would. Given this 
difference between punishment and compensation, it is interesting to see how 
a third party would choose between these intervention options. Would she be 
more inclined to enforce justice and let the punishment fit the crime, or would 
she be more inclined to directly help the victim? This paper delves further into 
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 this matter. 
The existing studies on third-party behavior focus mainly on third-party 
punishment. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) were the first to experimentally 
study third-party punishment behavior. The third-party punishment experiment 
typically consists of two stages. In the first stage, a dictator shares an 
endowment pie with a recipient, and an unaffected third party observes the 
way the dictator shares the pie. In the second stage, the third party can decide 
whether or not to inflict costly punishment on the dictator. Every dollar spent 
on punishment reduces the dictator’s monetary payoff. Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004) find that a substantial number of subjects punish dictators who violate 
the fairness norm. The amount of punishment inflicted is positively correlated 
with the severity of the norm violation. Many other experimental studies have 
since extended and modified the setting to analyze other related aspects 
(Kurzban et al., 2007; Coffman, 2011; Marlowe et al., 2008). In addition to 
punishment, it is also found that the unaffected third party is willing to reward 
just behaviors and the strength of reward is positively correlated with the 
generosity of the dictator (Almenberg et al., 2011; Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 
2013). 
Both third-party punishment and reward are interventions imposed on the 
dictator who causes distributive inequality, while the welfare of the recipient is 
kept intact. Little is known about third-party preferences regarding the welfare 
of the passive recipient since the effect of intervention on the recipient is 
indirect in the repetitive games and untraceable in the one-shot games. It is 
shown that third-party intervention imposed on the dictator, or even the 
availability of the intervention, causes the dictator to be more generous to the 
recipient in repeated games. In this case, the third party might use such an 
intervention to improve the welfare of the recipient indirectly. However, the 
third party also punishes or rewards in the one-shot dictator games, where 
their decisions affect the dictator only and have no impact on the recipient’s 
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 payoff. In this case, third parties might just use punishment as a means to 
enforce the fairness norms against those selfish dictators who violate them 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); or they simply use punishment or reward to express 
their disapproval or approval of certain behavior, without further implications 
for the general distribution among the group (Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2013). 
As a result, it is still not clear if third-party intervention is intended to punish 
bad behavior and reward good behavior, or to achieve a preferred distribution 
on a larger scale. 
This study aims to provide a clearer picture of an unaffected individual 
party’s distributive preferences by extending the means of intervention to 
compensating the passive recipient in a dictator game. Against the 
well-studied punishment behavior, we explore an individual’s willingness to 
compensate and its relation to punishment decisions. In particular, we examine 
the subject’s punishment and compensation decisions when these two means 
are separate and independent, as well as when they are simultaneous and joint. 
In the separate decision treatments, the subjects make either punishment 
decisions or compensation decisions; in the joint decision treatment, subjects 
make both decisions at the same time. 
The results show that third-party subjects are willing to pay for both 
punishment and compensation when inequality arises. However, compensation 
is preferred to punishment as a means of third-party intervention. On average, 
the subjects spend more on compensation than on punishment conditional on 
the dictator’s transfer amount, and the higher average spending on 
compensation is caused by a higher propensity to compensate among the 
subjects. Furthermore, there are two common triggers of third-party 
punishment and compensation: inequality in payoffs between the third party 
and the relevant reference player, and violation of the fairness norm. This 
shows that subjects care not only about the payoff distribution between 
themselves and the relevant other, but also the payoff distribution between the 
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 other players. The fairness norm is more salient than the inequality aversion 
norm. We also find a high degree of individual heterogeneity in the subject 
pool. About 85% of subjects can be categorized as own-payoff maximizers, 
unconditional interveners and conditional interveners. The intervention 
behavior in our experiments is well predicted by the inequality aversion model 
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and the social preferences model of Charness and 
Rabin (2002). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature; Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedure; Section 4 
reports the results of the experiment, and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
The role of an unaffected third party in group-payoff distribution has been 
extensively studied in experiments since the third-party punishment game was 
first introduced by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) 
first provided evidence showing that third-party punishment is a strong 
mechanism for norm enforcement. This complements the previous findings 
regarding second-party punishment (Kahneman et al., 1986; Andreoni et al., 
2003) 
Subsequently, economists have studied other aspects of the nature and 
effectiveness of third-party punishment. Kurzban et al. (2007) find that the 
presence of an audience increases the strength of punishment. Coffman (2011) 
shows that the existence of an intermediary reduces punishment and causes 
more inequality in group distribution. Marlowe et al. (2008) find that 
punishment increases with population size. In cross-culture studies, 
researchers find that subjects are punished more severely in larger and more 
complicated societies. In her recent published paper, Erte Xiao find in a novel 
experiment that if the third-party punishment brings monetary profit to the 
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 punisher, it no longer has a strong impact on the behavior of norm violators 
(Xiao, 2013). 
Despite strong interest among economists in third-party punishment 
behavior, as mentioned earlier, the latter is not the only means of third-party 
intervention. Third-party reward has received increasing attention in recent 
years. Almenberg et al. (2011) show that subjects in the role of third party 
reward generous behaviors and punish selfish behaviors, and that rewarding is 
as common as punishing. Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2013) find that 
punishment is crowded out by rewards when both options are available 
compared to when punishment is the only option. They show that such 
crowding out reflects the fact that subjects use punishment or reward as 
expressions of disapproval or approval of dictators’ behaviors. When there are 
more options, the subjects turn to the less costly decision to express their 
opinion. In this sense, punishment and reward are substitutes for the third 
party to evaluate a dictator’s decision. Similar results are also shown in an 
investment game where a third party can punish selfish responders or reward 
low-pay senders (Charness et al., 2008). 
The additional option of reward enlarges the choice set of third parties, and 
increases the degree of freedom for third parties should they intervene in 
group income distribution; however, there are still strong restrictions on the 
effectiveness of third-party interventions. Experimental results show that third 
parties reward dictators only when they give a generous amount, especially 
when they give more than half of an endowment, which rarely happens in a 
dictator game (Almenberg et al., 2011). As a result, third-party reward is not as 
applicable as third-party punishment, which takes place when the dictator 
gives less than half of an endowment. Furthermore, both punishment and 
reward are targeted at the dictator, and they have no direct effect on recipients, 
especially when their payoff is rather low. In this sense, neither means 
alleviate the pain of those who suffer undeserved inequality. To fill this gap, in 
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 this paper we examine the distributive preferences of an unaffected third party 
regarding the payoffs of each member in a group, especially their willingness 
to improve the welfare of passive and low-pay recipients through 
compensation. 
The literature on distributive justice suggests that individuals do care about 
the distribution of welfare within a group and are willing to sacrifice their own 
benefits to ensure just distribution. In an empirical study, Corneo and Fong 
(2008) estimate willingness to pay for distributive justice using fiscal data and 
find that US households value a just income distribution at about one-fifth of 
their disposable income. Becker and Miller (2009) show by experiment that 
subjects pay to compensate for initial endowment inequalities, especially when 
they do not know the assignment of their own endowment. The subjects 
compensate the low-endowment member less when they know about their own 
endowment. This result implies that distributive preferences vary depending 
on the position of the beholder. In a recent paper that revisited the bias of 
second-party punishment and third-party punishment, Leibbrandt and 
Lopez-Perez (2012) note that the third parties are motivated to mitigate the 
distress of poor and weak second parties when they cannot defend themselves. 
Our paper verifies this. 
One paper that examines subject’s third-party compensation behavior is 
Leliveld et al. (2012). This psychological paper has a special focus on the 
relation between empathy and compensation decisions. They find that subjects 
with a higher measure of empathy tend to compensate the recipient while 
those with a lower measure of empathy tend to punish the dictator. Our paper, 
on the other hand, focus on the direct comparison between individual’s 
preferences over punishment and over compensation. Compared to Leliveld et 
al. (2012), the joint-decision treatment in our study allows more freedom for 
subjects to intervene as a third party, and we can observe the tradeoffs that 
they make between these two options. The separate-decision treatments, 
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 furthermore, allow us to compare punishment and compensation when they 
are the only means of intervention. 
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 3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Treatments 
The experiment is composed of three treatments. In each, three subjects form a 
group and play a two-stage third-party intervention game. Each player is 
randomly assigned a role: dictator, recipient, or third party. At the first stage, 
the dictator and the recipient share a pie of S$20 (equivalent to US$16). The 
dictator decides how to split the pie, and his decision is implemented 
immediately. For simplicity, we restrict the dictator’s transfer amount to 
multiples of S$1. The recipient is a passive player and has no influence on the 
dictator’s decision. She has to accept the amount the dictator allocates. At the 
second stage, the third party observes the allocation between the dictator and 
the recipient and can choose to intervene in the group payoff distribution at 
her own cost.  
In Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), the third party is endowed with half of the 
shared pie in the dictator game. As a result, there are two possible reasons for 
the third party to punish the dictator when he fails to share half of the pie with 
the recipient. One reason is enforcement of the fairness norm between the 
dictator and the recipient, and another possible reason is the disadvantageous 
inequality between the third party and the dictator. In order to rule out the 
second incentive of punishment, we assign more than half of the shared pie to 
the third party, namely S$15 (equivalent to US$12). In this case, as long as the 
dictator shares more than S$5 with the recipient, the third party has an 
advantage in payoff within the group, and any decision to intervene is thus due 
to motives of norm enforcement alone. 
The three treatments differ from each other in the way in which the third 
party can affect the final distribution within the group. In the first treatment, 
the standard third-party punishment game (TPP), the third party can punish the 
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 dictator by reducing her payoff. Every dollar the third party spends in 
punishment will reduce the dictator’s payoff by two dollars. The second 
treatment is the third-party compensation game (TPC), which allows the third 
party to compensate the recipient by increasing her payoff. Every dollar the 
third party spends in compensation will increase the recipient’s payoff by two 
dollars. In the last treatment, the third-party punishment and compensation 
game (TPPC), the third party can punish the dictator and compensate the 
recipient at the same time. Having this expanded choice set, the third party can 
choose to punish the dictator only, to compensate the recipient only, or to 
affect the payoff of both at the same time. The cost of punishment and 
compensation is the same as in the other treatments; the third party cannot 
reduce the dictator’s payoff below S$0 in treatments that allow punishment. In 




1 Third-Party Punishment yes - 21
2 Third-Party Compensation - yes 27
3 Third-Party Punishment & Compensation yes yes 27
Means of Intervention
 
Table 3.1 Experimental Design 
 
3.2 Procedures 
The subjects were recruited from the undergraduate students at Nanyang 
Technological University in Singapore. The recruitment information was 
distributed through the university-level mass email system, and those who 
responded were from various academic backgrounds. We had 21 subjects for 
the TPP treatment, 27 for the TPC treatment, and 27 for the TPPC treatment. 
Each subject was assigned to one treatment only. 
At the beginning of each session, the instructions were distributed among 
the participants and were read aloud by the experimenter. The subjects had to 
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 answer a short quiz regarding the payoffs of each role in a few hypothesized 
scenarios to prove their understating of the game before they could proceed to 
the game itself. Clarifying questions were asked privately. At the end of the 
session, the subjects completed a self-report survey. All experiments were run 
in the computer labs, using the z-Tree program (Fischbacher 2007). Each 
session lasted about 1 hour. Including a show-up fee of S$3, participants 
earned S$12 on average. 
We use the strategy method to elicit the third party’s intervention decisions. 
Given the restriction on the transfer amount, the dictator decides from the 21 
possible allocations which vary from keeping the whole pie (i.e., giving S$0) 
to transferring the whole pie, S$20, to the recipient. The third party is asked to 
give her responses to all the 21 possible scenarios. In the TPPC treatment, a 
third party will make altogether 42 judgments for both the dictator and the 
recipient. In the TPP and TPC treatments, she will make 21 judgments for only 
the dictator or the recipient. 
The strategy method is used increasingly often in experimental studies, 
especially in third-party punishment games. Compared to the direct-response 
method, the strategy method generates richer data for analysis, especially 
responses to the off-equilibrium decisions. Furthermore, the strategy method 
allows clean comparisons between treatments, because the responses are 
dependent on the results in the first stage, which might vary between different 
treatments. It is shown that in most cases, the strategy method generates 
qualitatively similar results to the direct-response method (Brandts and 
Charness, 2011). 
Following Brandts and Charness (2011), Charness and Rabin (2002) and 
Coffman (2011), we adopt the role reversal method in a repeated game without 
feedback. Each game is played for three rounds. In each round, a player is 
randomly grouped with another two players and assigned a role. As a result, 
the group composition and a player’s role change from round to round. This 
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 maintains the one-shot nature of the game and avoids reputation building and 
reciprocity incentives. In order to prevent learning effects and any strategic 
concerns, the subjects are not informed of their group members’ decisions in 
previous rounds until the end of the session. By then, the computer randomly 
chooses a binding round for payment among the payoff allocations of all three 
rounds. 
4. Experimental Results 
In this section, we present the results from the experiments from three aspects. 
First, we examine subjects’ preferences regarding punishment and 
compensation when they are separate decisions and when they are a joint 
decision. We compare the amount spent on punishment and compensation and 
the propensity to punish and compensate to reveal how subjects respond to 
different means of intervention. Second, based on the social preferences 
models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002), we 
explore the conditions that trigger third-party punishment and compensation. 
This analysis allows us to infer the norms that the third party intends to 
enforce for the group payoff distribution. Finally, we look at the individual 
heterogeneity from subjects’ intervention behaviors. 
4.1 Punishment and Compensation 
In the TPP and TPC treatments, subjects made punishment and compensation 
decisions separately. They had only one means of intervention in each 
treatment and could affect only the payoff of the relevant player in the group 
(i.e., the dictator in the TPP treatment and the recipient in the TPC treatment). 
Meanwhile, in the TPPC treatment, subjects faced two means of intervention 
at the same time, and could make joint decisions to affect the payoffs of both 
players. In particular, subjects could choose to punish the dictator only, to 
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 compensate the recipient only, to do both at the same time, or to do nothing at 
all. Note that for both separate and joint decisions, subjects had the same 
budget for intervention. 
To show subjects’ preferences for punishment and compensation, we 
present both graphic illustrations and results from controlled regressions. In 
Figures 2.1-3, Panel A shows the comparisons between the spending 
(probability) on punishment and compensation when they are separate 
decisions, and Panel B when they are joint decisions. 
Figure 2.1 shows the average spending on punishment in the TPP treatment 
and the average spending on compensation in the TPC treatment conditional 
on the dictator’s transfer amount. In Panel A and Panel B, the demand for 
punishment and the demand for compensation are both downward sloping. 
Both demand curves have a kink at S$10, the midpoint of the shared pie 
between the dictator and the recipient. The slopes are steeper when the 
dictator’s transfer is below S$10 than when it is above S$10. The kinked 
demand curves are evidence of the fairness norm in the payoff distribution 
between the dictator and the recipient from the perspective of the unaffected 
third party, in addition to the previous evidence from the perspective of the 
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Figure 3.1 Average Spending on Punishment and Compensation 
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Result 1. The demand for punishment and the demand for compensation of the 
third party are downward sloping as the dictator's transfer increases, and both 
demand curves kink at the midpoint of the shared pie. 
 
Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows that, when punishment and compensation are 
separate decisions, subjects spend more to compensate the recipients who are 
at a disadvantage compared to punishing dictators who cause such inequality. 
In particular, if the dictator keeps all the endowment for himself and transfers 
S$0 to the recipient, the subjects spend S$3.89 on average to increase the 
recipient’s payoff by S$7.80 or spend S$2.76 to reduce the payoff of the 
selfish dictator by S$5.50. In another case, when the dictator narrowly fails to 
share half of the pie and transfers S$9 to the recipient, the third party spends 
on average about S$1 on compensation and only about 30 cents on punishment. 
The Mann-Whitney tests show that compensation is significantly higher than 
punishment when the dictator’s transfer is between S$1 to S$12 (see Table 
3.A1 and Table 3.A2 in the Appendix). 
Panel B shows a similar result from the joint decision treatment: subjects 
spend more on compensation than on punishment. When the dictator’s transfer 
is below S$10, the differences are significant, with only two exceptions (see 
the Mann-Whitney tests in Table 3.A1 and Table 3.A2 in the Appendix). 
Interestingly, in contrast to TPP and TPC, subjects in TPPC do not punish or 
compensate when the dictator’s transfer is above S$10. The slope of the 
demand curves of punishment and compensation are both zero in these 
situations. It seems that the fairness norm between the dictator and the 
recipient is more salient for the third party in the TPPC treatment. 
 
Result 2. Subjects spend more on compensation than on punishment when 
decisions are separate, as well as when they are joint.  
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To understand the differences in third parties’ average spending on 
punishment and compensation, we examine the percentage of third parties 
who spend a positive amount on intervention at different levels of the 
dictator’s transfer amount (Figure 3.2), as well as the average spending 
conditional on a positive intervention decision (Figure 3.3). Panel A of Figure 
3.2 shows that for separate decisions, the percentage of subjects who 
compensate in the TPC treatment is generally higher than those who punish in 
the TPP treatment at each level of the dictator’s transfer. In particular, for 
transfer amounts between S$5 and S$14, the percentage of third parties who 
compensate is more than double that of those who punish. Panel B shows that 
for the joint decisions, more subjects choose to compensate the recipient than 
choose to punish the dictator at each level of the dictator’s transfer. For 
transfers between S$5 to S$10, the number of compensators is more than 
double the number of punishers. The higher intervention rate of compensation 
could be one of the reasons for its higher average spending. We verify this 
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Figure 3.2 Percentage of Subjects Who Punished and Compensated 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the average spending on punishment and compensation 
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 conditional on a positive intervention decision. Compared to the unconditional 
spending, the differences between compensation and punishment diminish. 
For separate decisions (see Panel A), the conditional spending on punishment 
is not significantly different from that on compensation for all levels of the 
dictator’s transfer. For joint decisions (see Panel B), the differences are not 
significant, with three exceptions (see Table 3.A3 and 3.A4 for conditional 
spending levels and the results of the Mann-Whitney tests). These results show 
that subjects who decide to punish the dictator and/or to compensate the 
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Figure 3.3 Conditional Average Spending on Punishment and Compensation 
 
Result 3. The higher spending on compensation is mainly caused by a higher 
intervention rate of the compensation decision. The intervention spending is 
similar between subjects who decide to punish and those who decide to 
compensate. 
 
In the following controlled regression analysis, we verify the above results. 
The regressors include the individual characteristics and subjective responses 
from the self-report survey. 
Regression results are presented in Table 3.2. Models 1-3 are the estimates 
of the separate decisions and Models 4-6 are those of joint decisions. For both 
 112
 cases, we regress subjects’ unconditional spending, intervention probability, 
and conditional spending on the explanatory variables. The main explanatory 
variables include the negative (positive) distance of the dictator’s transfer from 
S$10, the punishment dummy, gender, the amount transferred when the 








1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
deviate_neg 0.306*** 0.183*** 0.311*** 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.275***
[0.0201] [0.0194] [0.0267] [0.0165] [0.0251] [0.0299]
deviate_pos -0.0381*** -0.193*** 0.0336 0.00132
[0.00973] [0.0250] [0.0287] [0.00642]
punishment -0.584*** -0.942*** -0.451* -0.0106 -0.181 0.754**
[0.128] [0.179] [0.233] [0.0872] [0.215] [0.293]
female 0.0674 -0.235 0.154 0.498*** 1.255*** 0.894***
[0.127] [0.154] [0.191] [0.0938] [0.215] [0.242]
female_punish -0.238 -0.404* -0.111 -0.318*** -0.790*** -1.082***
 [0.176] [0.240] [0.308] [0.119] [0.294] [0.338]
own_transfer 0.0711*** 0.0402** 0.0935*** 0.0622*** 0.211*** -0.0116
[0.0130] [0.0163] [0.0255] [0.00824] [0.0229] [0.0228]
year 0.181** 0.482*** -0.018 -0.111*** -0.285*** -0.202**
[0.0798] [0.106] [0.134] [0.0414] [0.0931] [0.0878]
foreigner 0.048 -0.287** 0.292 -0.034 -0.181 -0.454***
[0.0953] [0.133] [0.192] [0.0639] [0.150] [0.165]
religion 0.115*** 0.190*** 0.145*** 0.0699*** 0.0591 0.416***
[0.0221] [0.0312] [0.0493] [0.0240] [0.0579] [0.0577]
round2 0.052 0.254* -0.122 0.00634 0.278 -0.232
[0.111] [0.149] [0.200] [0.0913] [0.206] [0.182]
round3 -0.172 -0.346** -0.138 -0.086 0.0431 -0.434*
[0.124] [0.157] [0.235] [0.0878] [0.208] [0.243]
Constant -0.455** -1.375*** 0.0207 -0.517*** -2.386*** -1.180***
[0.192] [0.277] [0.337] [0.126] [0.372] [0.402]
Observations 945 945 379 798 418 162
R-squared 0.518 0.427 0.403 0.486
Estimation OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS
punish_effect -0.834 -1.904*** -1.219 -0.339*** -1.153*** -0.425
 [0.624] [0.679] [1.101] [0.119] [0.301] [0.344]
predicted prob -0.566 -0.395
 (0.394) (0.094)
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 3.2 Regression Analysis 
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 The negative (positive) distance variable is calculated by taking the absolute 
value of the difference between the dictator’s transfer and S$10 when the 
transfer amount is lower (higher) than S$10. It measures how a negative 
(positive) deviation from the fairness norm between the other two subjects 
influences the unaffected third party’s intervention decision. Consequently, the 
constant in the model measures the intervention level when the dictator’s 
transfer is exactly S$10. 
In Models 1-3, we pool the data from the TPP and TPC treatments. The 
positive and significant estimates of the negative deviation from S$10 show 
that subjects’ intervention increases as the dictator’s transfer deviates 
negatively from the fairness norm. In particular, in Model 1, subjects on 
average spend 30 cents more in response to a decrease of S$1 in the dictator’s 
transfer given that the transfer is lower than S$10. This estimate supplements 
Result 1 and is in line with previous studies showing that third-party 
punishment decisions increase as fairness violation increases (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). Since our data include compensation spending as well, we 
show that this positive correlation between the level of third-party intervention 
and the violation of the fairness norm in the dictator game is true in a more 
general sense.   
On the other hand, subject intervention is negatively correlated with 
positive deviation from the fairness norm. Although the direction of influence 
is intuitive and the coefficient estimates are rather small, the subjects are not 
expected to spend on intervention when the dictator’s transfer is above S$10 
given the fairness norm between the dictator and the recipient. However, a 
substantial proportion of the subjects do so, especially in the TPC treatment. 
This behavior could be explained by the inequality aversion to the payoff 
between oneself and the relevant actor predicted by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
We will look at this aspect of behavior in more detail in a later section. 
The changed sign of the deviation from negative to positive is consistent 
 114
 with the kinked demand curve shown in Figure 3.1, which is evidence of the 
fairness norm. From the perspective of average spending, a fair split of the pie 
is a major norm to enforce for the group-payoff distribution and the dictator’s 
failure to do so would trigger the intervention regardless of the means. 
From Models 2 and 3, subjects’ intervention decision (to intervene or not), 
and their conditional intervention spending (the spending of those who 
intervene) are both subject to the influence of the dictator’s transfer, and in 
similar ways. Model 4-6 show the regression results from the joint decision 
treatment. Subjects’ intervention behavior in the joint decision treatments is 
also negatively correlated with the dictator’s transfer when it is below S$10. 
When the dictator’s transfer is above S$10, there is very little intervention and 
the estimate is not significant. Estimates from the regression models are 
consistent with Result 1 concerning the negative slope and kink point of the 
demand curve of punishment and compensation. 
The punishment dummy takes a value of 1 for the TPP treatment when 
decisions are separate and for the punishment option when decisions are joint, 
and 0 otherwise. We consider the interaction effects between the punishment 
option and gender. The gender dummy takes a value of 1 for female and 0 for 
male. Result 2 is qualitatively measured by the punishment effect in all 
regression models. The punishment effect is estimated through a linear 
combination of the punishment dummy and its interaction with gender. Since 
the treatment dummy takes a value of 1 for the punishment decisions, a 
negative sign means that subjects spend less or intervene less for the 
punishment option. 
Model 1 shows that subjects spend on average S$0.83 less on punishment 
than on compensation and that this difference is not significant. Model 2 
verifies that the intervention rate is significantly lower in the punishment 
treatment. By taking the standard normal cumulative distribution function of 
the predicted treatments effect, we calculated the predicted probability 
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 differences between these two treatments. It is estimated that the response 
probability is 56.6% lower in the punishment treatment TPP than that in the 
compensation treatment TPC. In Model 3, when we control for the positive 
responses only, the difference in spending between punishment and 
compensation is insignificant. The controlled regression verifies the result 
from the above graphic illustration: the lower average spending in the 
punishment treatment is mainly driven by the lower response rate to punish. 
Subjects are more willing to intervene when they are allowed to compensate 
the worst-off party in the group, compared to when they are allowed to punish 
the dictator. However, those subjects who decide to intervene spend similar 
amounts on punishment and compensation when they have separate means of 
intervention. 
The punishment effects of the joint decisions are estimated from Models 4-6. 
On average, the subjects spend about 34 cents less on punishment than on 
compensation, and when we control for positive responses, spending on 
punishment is not significantly lower than that on compensation. The 
estimated difference in the intervention probability is about 39.5%, 
significantly lower for punishment than for compensation. Similar to the 
separate decisions, the lower punishment level in the joint decision treatment 
is due to a lower punishment rate. 
Other than the main variables, such as dictator’s transfer and treatment 
dummy, we have subjects’ decisions as dictator in another round from each 
treatment. Table 3.2 shows that in most cases, subjects’ own dictator decisions 
are significantly correlated with their intervention decisions, for both spending 
levels and spending probability. A generous subject has a higher willingness to 
engage in third-party intervention. 
Other variables include a subject’s school year, nationality, and religious 
belief. The year variable takes a value of 1 to 4 for freshman, sophomore, 
junior and senior students, respectively. From Table 3.2, we see that the school 
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 year does not have stable effects on intervention spending. The nationality 
dummy takes a value of 1 for foreigners and 0 otherwise. The negative signs 
show that foreign students tend to spend less on intervention, although not all 
the differences are significant. The religion variable takes a value from 0-7 
depending on the importance of the subject’s religion; subjects without 
religion are indicated by 0 in this case. Table 3.2 shows that the more 
important religion is to the subject, the higher the subject spends on 
intervention.  
4.2 The Norms of Intervention 
Compared to second-party punishment, third-party punishment is argued to be 
a better device for norm enforcement, not only because third parties are a 
majority in any community, but also because they are impartial in their 
punishment decisions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Different models of social 
preferences predict different norms to enforce, or different factors that trigger 
punishment or compensation. Thus, it is suggested that norms should be 
inferred by observing actual intervention behaviors, instead of making 
assumptions (Carpenter and Matthews 2009).  
Before we proceed to the detailed results, we briefly discuss the predictions 
of intervention behaviors based on two relevant theoretical models, namely the 
inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and the social 
preferences model of Charness and Rabin (2002). By comparing the 
experimental results against the predictions from different models, we can 
evaluate the predicting power of these two theoretical models regarding 
third-party intervention behavior. 
One of the motivations of third-party intervention is inequality aversion. 
The inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that 
individual cares about their relative payoff among all the reference actors. 
Inequality in payoffs between the decision maker and each of the other 
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 relevant players causes disutility. Both advantageous inequality and 
disadvantageous inequality are “bad”, while disadvantageous inequality causes 
a higher loss in utility. Utility is maximized only when payoff equality within 
the group is realized. Based on this model and its assumptions regarding the 
weights of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, we have the 
following predictions. 
 
Predictions of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
(i) In the TPP treatment, subjects will punish only when the dictator’s 
transfer is lower than S$5. 
(ii) In the TPC treatment, subjects will compensate only when the 
dictator’s transfer is below S$15. 
(iii) In the TPPC treatment, subjects will both punish and compensate 
when the dictator’s transfer is below S$5, will only compensate when 
the transfer is between S$10 and S$15, and will not spend on 
intervention when the transfer is above S$15. 
In the TPP treatment, although the payoffs of both the dictator and the 
recipient affect the third party’s utility, the third party can only affect the 
payoff of the dictator. When the dictator’s transfer is below S$5, the dictator’s 
payoff is higher than the third party’s initial endowment, and the recipient’s 
payoff is far below the third party’s endowment. As a result, if the third party 
chooses to reduce the dictator’s payoff through punishment, she can decrease 
her disadvantageous inequality relative to the dictator and simultaneously 
decrease her advantageous inequality relative to the recipient. To punish the 
dictator, the third party suffers a loss of private payoff, while the increase in 
utility from the decreased inequality might raise his total utility. When the 
dictator’s transfer is between S$5 and S$15, the third party’s endowment is 
higher than the payoffs of both the dictator and the recipient. There are only 
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 advantageous inequalities for the third party in this case. Spending on 
punishment would increase her inequality with the dictator, while reducing the 
inequality with the recipient to the same level. Since the change of relative 
payoff does not affect the third party’s utility, spending on punishment leads to 
a lower utility level for it reduces the private payoff of the third party. As a 
result, the third party would not punish in this case. When the dictator’s 
transfer is above S$15, the third party suffers from an advantageous inequality 
relative to the dictator, and a disadvantageous inequality relative to the 
recipient. Spending on punishment would further increase both inequalities 
relative to the dictator and the recipient. Considering the decrease of the 
private payoff, punishment is not an optimal option for a third party in this 
case. To sum, the third party punishes only when the dictator’s transfer is 
lower than S$5. 
Similarly, in the TPC treatment, for the third party the player who can be 
affected is the recipient. When the dictator’s transfer is below S$5, spending 
on compensation will increase the disadvantageous inequality between the 
third party and the dictator, while decreasing the advantageous inequality 
between the third party and the recipient. It is possible that the latter increase 
in utility exceeds the former decrease in utility because the decrease in 
advantageous inequality is three times that of the disadvantageous inequality 
in absolute terms. Considering the decrease in private payoff, it is still possible 
for the third party to compensate the recipient. When the dictator’s transfer is 
between S$5 and S$15, spending on compensation will decrease the 
advantageous inequality between the third party and both the dictator and the 
recipient. Considering the decrease of private payoff, compensation might still 
lead to a higher utility level. When the dictator’s transfer is above S$15, 
spending on compensation would increase the disadvantageous inequality with 
the recipient and decrease the advantageous inequality with the dictator. Since 
the disadvantageous inequality is weightier than the advantageous inequality, 
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 spending on compensation would decrease the part of utility concerning the 
relative payoffs. Together with a lower private payoff, the utility of the third 
party would decrease with positive compensation spending. To sum, the third 
party will spend on compensation only when the dictator’s transfer is below 
S$15. The decision rules are similar in the joint decision treatment TPPC. 
One feature of Fehr and Schmidt’s model is that the inequality that bothers 
the player is self-centered, which means she only cares about the relative 
payoff between herself and the relevant players, but does not care about the 
distribution between the other two players. As a result, the well observed 
fairness norm is not reflected in the predictions of this model. 
Another relevant model is the more comprehensive one proposed by 
Charness and Rabin (2002). In their conceptual multi-person model of social 
preferences (see their appendix), a player receives positive utility not only 
from her own private payoff, but also from the payoff increase of the worst-off 
player, the increase of total group payoff, and the norm enforcement if the first 
player misbehaves. This model generates a few predictions that differ from the 
inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
 
Predictions of Charness and Rabin (2002) 
(i) The third-party intervention would be triggered by violation of the 
fairness norm. 
(ii) In the joint decision treatment TPPC, subjects will use both 
punishment and compensation as means of intervention to adjust the 
group-payoff distribution. 
(iii) Spending on compensation is positive and is higher than that on 
punishment. 
First of all, the model assumes that the player suffers from the fact that some 
other player misbehaves, even if the former is not the victim. Actions taken to 
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 amend the situation, such as a punishment imposed on the misbehaving player 
increases one’s utility. Justice theories argue that intervention takes place when 
justice or social norms are violated, which can be broken down into 
distributive justice and procedural justice (Konow, 2003). In the case of a 
dictator game where players’ roles are randomly assigned, the violation of a 
fair split might directly cause intervention since no player deserves more of 
the pie than the other. This phenomenon is observed in previous experimental 
results (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Subjects who care about fair distribution 
between others might engage in costly intervention, such as punishment and 
compensation, at an unequal split. 
Second, similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the model predicts that in the 
TPPC treatment, the third party will use both punishment and compensation to 
adjust the distribution of the group payoff. In addition to her own private 
payoff, the player also cares about the welfare of the worst-off player, as well 
as that of the active player. In particular, the payoff of the dictator will enter 
the utility of the third party only if the dictator does not misbehave too much. 
In the case of any selfish transfer, the third party would even like to decrease 
the dictator’s payoff through punishment. As a result, the third party would 
thus have a stronger concern for the distribution between the other two players. 
This implies that compared to treatments of separate decisions, subjects should 
spend on both punishment and compensation in the combined treatment, even 
without a change in the intervention budget, for spending on both means 
would further alleviate the inequality between the other two players compared 
to an identical spending on only one means of intervention. Unlike Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), the double use of punishment and compensation prevails as 
long as the third party is triggered to intervene. 
Last but not least, this model implies a stronger incentive for compensation. 
A major difference between this model and Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) is that 
the player is assumed to care about the welfare of the worst-off recipient, as 
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 well as the total welfare of all relevant players. Conceptually, this model 
predicts higher spending on compensation than Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for 
compensation not only increases the payoff of the worst-off recipient, but also 
increases the group payoff, and both add to the third party’s utility. However, 
without further assumptions of individuals’ preferences, it is not clear whether 
compensation would be higher than punishment. In the previous subsection, 
we have shown that subjects spend more on compensation than on punishment, 
and we will not discuss this result here. 
One of the benefits of the strategy method is that it generates rich data and 
makes it possible for us to infer the distributive norms by observing the 
conditions that trigger the intervention. Here we focus on Panel A of Figure 
3.2, the percentage of subjects who intervene at each level of the dictator’s 
transfer when intervention decisions are separate. For the punishment 
decisions in the TPP treatment, we see that there are two abrupt decreases in 
the percentage of punishers over the dictator’s transfer. The first decrease is 
from S$4 to S$5, and the second from S$9 to S$10. A higher percentage of 
punishers indicate that more subjects perceive a certain behavior as selfish and 
deserving of punishment. From the sudden change in the number of punishers, 
we can infer two major conditions that trigger intervention. 
First, many more subjects punish when the dictator’s transfer is lower than 
S$5. This implies that S$5 is a critical amount for the dictator’s transfer which 
triggers punishment. This observation is in line with the prediction of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) that subjects care about the relative payoff between 
themselves and the relevant reference actors. When the dictator transfers less 
than S$5 to the recipients, they keep more than S$15 for themselves, which 
exceeds the endowment of the third party. A third party might choose to punish 
out of inequality aversion. Those subjects who choose to punish at S$4 instead 
of S$5 reveal such a distributive preference. This behavior is evidence of 
Prediction (i) on the punishment behavior based on the inequality aversion 
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 model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
Another critical amount that triggers punishment is S$9, when the dictator 
fails to share half of the pie with the recipient. We see that very few subjects 
punish the dictator when the transfer amount is higher than S$10, and the 
average punishment level is negligible. This is in line with Prediction (i) of 
Charness and Rabin (2002), which states that a fair split is the norm to enforce 
in a dictator game (also see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Enforcing an equal 
share between the dictator and the recipient through punishment shows that 
subjects care about the distribution of payoffs between the other two parties. 
The above two conditions (i.e., the inequality in payoff with the relevant 
reference player and the violation of the fairness norm between the other two 
players) can also be observed in the compensation treatment from Panel A of 
Figure 3.2. First, many more subjects choose to compensate the recipient when 
the dictator transfers S$9 compared to when the dictator transfers S$10. A 
failure to share the pie equally triggers third-party compensation. Second, the 
percentage of compensators decreases until the dictator’s transfer equals S$15. 
We check each individual decision and find that, other than two subjects who 
unconditionally spend a fixed small amount on compensation, no other 
subjects compensate the recipient when the dictator’s transfer is above S$15. 
In particular, a substantial number of subjects compensate the recipient for a 
transfer of S$10-S$13. Note that S$15 is the endowment of the third party, and 
thus what they are doing is minimizing the payoff differences between 
themselves and the recipients, just as Prediction (ii) of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) states. 
 
Result 4. There are two major triggers of third-party intervention: inequality 
in payoffs between the third party and the relevant reference actor, and 
violation of the fairness norm.  
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 The first trigger is predicted by the inequality aversion model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), and the second is predicted by the social preferences model of 
Charness and Rabin (2002). This result implies that the subject cares about the 
payoff distribution between herself and the other relevant player, and also 
about the payoff distribution between the other two players. In the third-party 
punishment experiment of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), it is impossible to 
disentangle these two conditions triggering punishment for, in their design, 
violation of the fairness norm is equivalent to income inequality. Our results 
show that both situations bother the third party and cause them to engage in 
costly intervention, even at their own monetary cost. From the number of 
subjects who respond in these two treatments, we can conclude that the 
fairness norm is more salient than the concern of inequality aversion.  
Panel B of Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of subjects who intervene in the 
joint decision treatment TPPC, where there are two relevant reference actors. 
We can see that the number of compensators is relatively stable. It does not 
vary much once subjects decide to compensate. However, the number of 
punishers decreases steadily as the dictator’s transfer increases. When both 
options are available, subjects are more inclined to be conditional punishers 
and unconditional compensators. 
From the figure we can also see that a substantial fraction of subjects choose 
both punishment and compensation at the same time. Statistics show that 
11.11% of subjects only punish and never compensate, 29.63% of subjects 
only compensate and never punish, and 40.74% of subjects do both for certain 
levels of the dictator’s transfer. Since there is no critical transfer amount that 
matters for joint-intervention decisions, the results support the more general 
prediction concerning the intervention from both sides of the Charness and 
Rabin (2002) model, compared to that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In addition, 
we note that there is no response from the third party when the dictator’s 
transfer is above $10. The fairness norm is a more salient norm that affects the 
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 third parties’ decisions when they have to take two other parties into 
consideration. 
 
Result 5. More than 40% of subjects in the joint decision treatment choose to 
punish and compensate at the same time at certain levels of the dictator’s 
transfer. 
 
4.3 Individual Heterogeneity 
The last analysis is on the individual heterogeneity of the intervention 
behavior. Using the strategic method, each subject makes a full decision plan 
against all possible amounts of the dictator’s transfer. According to the 
decision plan, we can plot the demand of intervention of each individual in 
different treatments and categorize them according to the recognizable patterns, 
as seen in Table 3.3 (see also the Appendix for the individual plots). 
 
TPP TPC
Punishment Compensation Punishment Compensation Total 
Panel A: Individual Intervention Curves 
Slope -0.122 -0.203 -0.0609 -0.113 -0.174
Std.Dev (0.128) (0.135) (0.0834) (0.107) (0.129)
Constant 1.906 3.327 0.904 1.741 2.645
Std.Dev (1.962) (2.154) (1.247) (1.649) (1.985)
Slope -0.262 -0.321 -0.145 -0.206 -0.352
Std.Dev (0.275) (0.261) (0.193) (0.209) (0.245) 
Constant 2.554 3.916 1.289 2.199 3.488
Std.Dev (2.575) (2.636) (1.743) (2.099) (2.510) 
Panel B: Categorization of Individuals
28.57% 14.81% - - 18.52%
4.76% 3.70% 25.93% 7.41% 14.81%
52.38% 74.07% 18.52% 48.15% 55.56%
14.29% 7.41% 7.41% 14.81% 11.11%
100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%










Note: In the TPPC treatment, the percent of subjects who never punished are 48.15%, and




Table 3.3 Individual Heterogeneity 
 
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the statistics of the estimated slopes of 
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 intervention curves in each treatment. First, most of the intervention curves are 
segmented and flat when the dictator’s transfer is above S$10. It can be seen 
that the slopes are steeper when the dictator’s transfer is below S$10, where 
there are many more positive observations of intervention decisions. Second, 
for both separate and joint decision, the slopes of compensation are steeper 
than those of punishment. This shows that subjects are more responsive to the 
result of the dictator game when they can compensate the recipient. These 
results are consistent with the previous findings. 
According to each individual’s plots, we can divide the subjects into four 
categories. The first type is subjects who never spend on intervention. These 
subjects do not care about distributive inequality between the dictator and the 
recipient, and nor do they care about inequality of payoffs between themselves 
and the relevant reference party. They are own-payoff maximizers. The second 
type is subjects who spend a constant amount on intervention regardless of the 
dictator’s transfer once they are triggered to intervene. These subjects are 
unconditional interveners, although they may differ in terms of the triggering 
transfer amount. The third type is subjects whose spending on intervention 
increases monotonically as the dictator’s transfer decreases. The increase 
might not be strictly monotonic, but it does not drop as the dictator transfer 
further decreases. These subjects are categorized as conditional interveners. 
The above three types count for about 85% of the subjects; the rest are 
subjects whose intervention spending is not regular and who thus do not 
belong to any of the above groups. There are fluctuations or humps in the 
decision plots. 
From Panel B of Table 3.3 we see that there are own-payoff maximizers in 
all treatments and for both means of intervention. Comparatively, more 
subjects avoid punishing others than avoid compensation. When decisions are 
separate, the percentage of subjects who never punish is twice that of subjects 
who never compensate. This preference is more obvious in the joint decision 
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 treatment TPPC, where subjects are not constrained by the means of 
intervention. Again, we see fewer subjects turning to punishment than to 
compensation. Among the three treatments, TPC has the highest intervention 
rate and TPP has the lowest. 
Furthermore, there are more conditional interveners than unconditional 
interveners in all treatments, which shows that subjects care about the 
distribution of payoffs among the group and make efforts to adjust accordingly. 
We must also to note that there are subjects who make irregular decisions, 
although not many. One interesting case is in treatment TPPC. Observation of 
the subject’s compensation decision plan shows that it is irregular. However, 
when we look at her total decision plan, the pattern is constant, which means 
the subject complements compensation with punishment and allocates a 
constant budget. 
 
Result 6. There is individual heterogeneity in the intervention behavior. About 
85% subjects can be categorized as own-payoff maximizers, unconditional 
interveners, or conditional interveners for both separate and joint decisions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present an experimental study of third-party compensation 
behavior. By expanding the choice set of intervention means, we allow a 
higher degree of freedom for the third party to intervene in a budget allocation 
exercise between two other players. The distributive preferences of the 
unaffected third party are inferred from his punishment and/or compensation 
decisions. 
The results from the study are as follow. First, compensation is preferred to 
punishment. On average, subjects spend more on compensation than on 
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 punishment conditional on the dictator’s transfer amount. This is true for both 
separate and joint decisions. It is found that the higher average spending on 
compensation is caused by a higher proportion of subjects who choose to 
compensation than those who chose to punish. Second, for both punishment 
and compensation decisions, there are two common conditions that trigger the 
third-party intervention: inequality in payoffs between the third party and the 
relevant reference player, and violation of the fairness norm. The former 
behavior is predicted by the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), and the latter is consistent with the results of previous third-party 
punishment studies and the predictions of Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model. 
Comparatively, the fairness distributive norm is more salient than the 
inequality aversion norm. Third, the subjects are heterogeneous in terms of 
their responses to unfair distributions, and their intervention behavior follows 
three major patterns. About 85% of subjects behave regularly and could be 
categorized into the following three types: the own-payoff maximizer, the 
unconditional intervener, and the conditional intervener. 
Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model provides a better prediction of subjects’ 
preference for compensation over punishment as the third party. Two elements 
in the model favor compensation behavior: the altruism concern for the 
worst-off player’s payoff and the efficiency concern for the group payoff. 
Spending on compensation raises the levels of both components, while 
spending on punishment lowers the second component but does not affect the 
first . A combining effect leads to a higher willingness to pay for compensation, 
and this could be why compensation is preferred to punishment. It is notable 
that previous studies on other means of intervention also find similar 
avoidance of punishment. For instance, both Almenberg et al. (2011) and 
Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2013) provide evidence that the intervention rates 
are higher for the reward option than for the punishment option in third-party 
punishment and reward games. Since there is no altruism concern in the 
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 third-party reward game, we can draw a primary conclusion that disutility 
arises when the group welfare or even the norm violator is harmed. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the distributive preferences of the 
unaffected third party. Previous studies mainly focus on third-party 
punishment imposed on the dictator, while our results provide new evidence of 
altruistic compensation behavior onto the recipient. There are two possible 
extensions for this experiment. First, as mentioned earlier, both the altruism 
concern and efficiency concern can be the driving factor of subjects’ 
compensation decisions. However, in the current experimental setting, we 
could not distinguish which is the dominant factor. By altering the efficiency 
factor of punishment and compensation to 1:1, instead of 1:2 in the current 
design, we could test the effectiveness of the efficiency concern. Second, our 
study has no answer for the efficiency of the third-party compensation. It is 
not clear if the dictators would be more selfish since the consequences of their 
action could be lessened by someone else, or if they would be motivated by 
the unaffected but pro-social third party to adhere to the norm of a fairer split 
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mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d)
0 2.762 3.889 1.333 2.185 3.519
(2.737) (2.636) (1.881) (2.095) (2.486)
1 2.381 3.556 1.148 1.926 3.074
(2.439) (2.439) (1.537) (1.900) (2.218)
2 2.000 3.259 1.111 1.815 2.926
(2.121) (2.086) (1.450) (1.755) (2.037)
3 1.714 3.000 0.926 1.556 2.481
(1.678) (1.941) (1.328) (1.528) (1.889)
4 1.429 2.556 0.667 1.370 2.037
(1.660) (1.739) (1.000) (1.445) (1.808)
5 1.000 2.370 0.370 1.148 1.519
(1.549) (1.573) (0.688) (1.199) (1.503)
6 0.810 2.000 0.296 1.111 1.407
(1.365) (1.387) (0.609) (1.050) (1.421)
7 0.667 1.815 0.222 0.852 1.074
(1.065) (1.241) (0.506) (0.949) (1.207)
8 0.524 1.370 0.074 0.519 0.593
(0.873) (1.006) (0.267) (0.700) (0.797)
9 0.286 1.037 0.037 0.333 0.370
(0.561) (0.898) (0.192) (0.555) (0.565)
10 0.095 0.556 0.000 0.037 0.037
(0.436) (0.801) (0.000) (0.192) (0.192)
11 0.095 0.556 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.436) (0.801)
12 0.095 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.301) (0.700)
13 0.095 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.301) (0.424)
14 0.048 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.218) (0.362)
15 0.143 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.478) (0.320)
16 0.143 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.478) (0.267)
17 0.095 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.301) (0.267)
18 0.048 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.218) (0.267)
19 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.267)
20 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.267)
obs 21 27 27 27 27  
 




TPP vs TPC TPPC TPP vs TPPC TPC vs TPPC TPP vs TPPC TPC vs TPPC
0 0.134 0.158 0.075 0.016 0.276 0.668
1 0.093 0.138 0.075 0.015 0.231 0.517
2 0.025 0.147 0.156 0.013 0.078 0.650
3 0.017 0.097 0.073 0.005 0.135 0.341
4 0.021 0.068 0.073 0.010 0.256 0.273
5 0.002 0.010 0.271 0.003 0.128 0.042
6 0.002 0.002 0.236 0.015 0.085 0.113
7 0.001 0.006 0.098 0.004 0.223 0.032
8 0.004 0.004 0.019 0.001 0.638 0.004
9 0.001 0.011 0.037 0.001 0.512 0.003
10 0.012 0.317 0.257 0.002 0.834 0.002
11 0.012 . 0.257 0.001 0.257 0.001
12 0.026 . 0.105 0.001 0.105 0.001
13 0.247 . 0.105 0.010 0.105 0.010
14 0.263 . 0.257 0.039 0.257 0.039
15 0.906 . 0.105 0.077 0.105 0.077
16 0.761 . 0.105 0.153 0.105 0.153
17 0.795 . 0.105 0.153 0.105 0.153
18 0.710 . 0.257 0.153 0.257 0.153
19 0.207 . . 0.153 . 0.153
20 0.207 . . 0.153 . 0.153
Dictator's
transfer
Punishment vs Compensation Total Spending
 





mean (s.d) obs mean (s.d) obs mean (s.d) obs mean (s.d) obs mean (s.d) obs
0 4.143 14 4.565 23 2.769 13 3.471 17 4.318 22
(2.316) (2.233) (1.833) (1.546) (2.009)
1 3.571 14 4.174 23 2.385 13 3.059 17 3.773 22
(2.138) (2.081) (1.387) (1.478) (1.824)
2 3.231 13 3.667 24 2.308 13 2.882 17 3.591 22
(1.787) (1.834) (1.251) (1.317) (1.623)
3 2.571 14 3.375 24 2.273 11 2.471 17 3.190 21
(1.399) (1.715) (1.104) (1.179) (1.504)
4 2.308 13 3.000 23 1.800 10 2.467 15 3.056 18
(1.548) (1.477) (0.789) (0.990) (1.305)
5 3.000 7 2.783 23 1.429 7 2.067 15 2.412 17
(1.000) (1.313) (0.535) (0.799) (1.176)
6 2.429 7 2.455 22 1.333 6 1.875 16 2.375 16
(1.272) (1.101) (0.516) (0.619) (1.025)
7 1.750 8 2.227 22 1.200 5 1.643 14 2.071 14
(1.035) (0.973) (0.447) (0.633) (0.829)
8 1.571 7 1.850 20 1.000 2 1.273 11 1.455 11
(0.787) (0.671) (0.000) (0.467) (0.522)
9 1.200 5 1.474 19 1.000 1 1.125 8 1.111 9
(0.447) (0.697) (.) (0.354) (0.333)
10 2.000 1 1.500 10 0.000 0 1.000 1 1.000 1
(.) (0.527) (0.000) (.) (.)
11 2.000 1 1.500 10 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(.) (0.527)
12 1.000 2 1.300 10 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.000) (0.483)
13 1.000 2 1.000 6 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.000) (0.000)
14 1.000 1 1.000 4 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(.) (0.000)
15 1.500 2 1.000 3 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.707) (0.000)
16 1.500 2 1.000 2 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.707) (0.000)
17 1.000 2 1.000 2 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.000) (0.000)
18 1.000 1 1.000 2 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(.) (0.000)
19 0.000 0 1.000 2 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0
(0.000) (0.000)














Table 3.A3 Summary of Statistics of Conditional Intervention Levels 
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 Punishment Compensation
TPP vs TPC TPPC TPP vs TPPC TPC vs TPPC TPP vs TPPC TPC vs TPPC
0 0.569 0.313 0.144 0.118 0.759 0.802
1 0.388 0.237 0.144 0.109 0.629 0.587
2 0.339 0.268 0.177 0.201 0.332 0.973
3 0.120 0.662 0.670 0.078 0.179 0.751
4 0.145 0.092 0.554 0.263 0.103 0.881
5 0.833 0.076 0.004 0.063 0.281 0.338
6 0.752 0.068 0.044 0.083 0.835 0.805
7 0.193 0.157 0.269 0.069 0.295 0.682
8 0.318 0.419 0.294 0.019 0.877 0.112
9 0.441 0.724 0.655 0.196 0.661 0.153
10 0.361 . . 0.361 0.317 0.361
11 0.361 . . . . .
12 0.392 . . . . .
13 . . . . . .
14 . . . . . .
15 0.221 . . . . .
16 0.317 . . . . .
17 . . . . . .
18 . . . . . .
19 . . . . . .
20 . . . . . .
Dictator's
transfer
Punishment vs Compensation Total Response
 
 
Table 3.A4 Mann-Whitney Tests on Conditional Intervention Levels 
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 subject coef cons R2 subject coef cons R2
101 0 0 201 0 1
[0] [0] [0] [0]
102 -0.0571*** 0.810*** 0.433 202 -0.260*** 4.264*** 0.917
[0.0150] [0.175] [0.0180] [0.210]
103 -0.271*** 4.095*** 0.737 203 -0.127*** 1.844*** 0.59
[0.0372] [0.435] [0.0243] [0.285]
104 -0.130*** 2.061*** 0.821 204 -0.266*** 4.091*** 0.813
[0.0139] [0.162] [0.0293] [0.343]
105 -0.0325*** 0.468*** 0.316 205 -0.283*** 5.069*** 0.967
[0.0110] [0.128] [0.0120] [0.140]
106 -0.169*** 2.403*** 0.496 206 0 0
[0.0391] [0.457] [0] [0]
107 0 0 207 -0.209*** 3.377*** 0.796
[0] [0] [0.0243] [0.284]
108 0 0 208 -0.258*** 4.203*** 0.903
[0] [0] [0.0194] [0.227]
109 -0.0948** 1.710*** 0.249 209 -0.286*** 4.476*** 0.839
[0.0378] [0.442] [0.0288] [0.336]
110 -0.234*** 3.528*** 0.762 210 0 0
[0.0300] [0.351] [0] [0]
111 -0.0519*** 0.758*** 0.545 211 -0.286*** 5*** 0.917
[0.0109] [0.127] [0.0198] [0.231]
112 -0.266*** 4.091*** 0.813 212 -0.125*** 1.866*** 0.706
[0.0293] [0.343] [0.0185] [0.216]
113 -0.169*** 2.403*** 0.496 213 0 0
[0.0391] [0.457] [0] [0]
114 -0.169*** 2.403*** 0.496 214 -0.0714*** 1.238*** 0.75
[0.0391] [0.457] [0.00946] [0.111]
115 0 0 215 -0.334*** 6.385*** 0.903
[0] [0] [0.0250] [0.293]
116 0 0 216 -0.266*** 4.091*** 0.813
[0] [0] [0.0293] [0.343]
117 -0.199*** 3.844*** 0.933 217 -0.488*** 7.740*** 0.825
[0.0122] [0.142] [0.0516] [0.603]
118 -0.0455 1.359*** 0.101 218 -0.157*** 2.381*** 0.753
[0.0312] [0.364] [0.0206] [0.241]
119 0 0 219 -0.260*** 4.264*** 0.917
[0] [0] [0.0180] [0.210]
120 -0.169*** 2.403*** 0.496 220 -0.248*** 3.861*** 0.832
[0.0391] [0.457] [0.0256] [0.299]
121 -0.501*** 7.680*** 0.797 221 -0.278*** 4.351*** 0.836
[0.0580] [0.678] [0.0282] [0.330]
222 -0.273*** 4.727*** 0.955
[0.0137] [0.160]
223 -0.500*** 7.619*** 0.799
[0.0575] [0.673]
224 -0.0922*** 1.303*** 0.438
[0.0240] [0.280]
225 -0.197*** 3.403*** 0.905
[0.0146] [0.171]
226 -0.0468*** 0.848*** 0.34
[0.0149] [0.175]
227 -0.161*** 2.420*** 0.733
[0.0223] [0.261]
mean -0.122 1.906 -0.203 3.327
s.d. (0.128) (1.962) (0.135) (2.154)
Notes:  
Obs = 21
Standard errors in brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TPP Punishment TPC Compensation
 
 
Table 3.A5 Slopes of Individual Intervention Curves in TPP and TPC 
(Dictator’s Transfer [0, 20]) 
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 subject coef cons R2 coef cons R2 coef cons R2
301 -0.0701*** 0.987*** 0.368 0 0 -0.0701*** 0.987*** 0.368
[0.0211] [0.246] [0] [0] [0.0211] [0.246]
302 -0.0130* 0.177* 0.136 -0.148*** 2.338*** 0.82 -0.161*** 2.515*** 0.774
[0.00750] [0.0877] [0.0159] [0.186] [0.0200] [0.234]
303 0 0 -0.0442*** 0.632*** 0.464 -0.0442*** 0.632*** 0.464
[0] [0] [0.0109] [0.127] [0.0109] [0.127]
304 -0.0299** 0.442*** 0.267 -0.175*** 2.706*** 0.765 -0.205*** 3.147*** 0.74
[0.0113] [0.133] [0.0223] [0.261] [0.0279] [0.326]
305 0 0 -0.257*** 4*** 0.833 -0.257*** 4*** 0.833
[0] [0] [0.0264] [0.309] [0.0264] [0.309]
306 -0.122*** 1.840*** 0.677 -0.0727*** 1.156*** 0.57 -0.195*** 2.996*** 0.714
[0.0193] [0.226] [0.0145] [0.169] [0.0283] [0.331]
307 -0.119*** 1.814*** 0.735 -0.190*** 2.944*** 0.792 -0.309*** 4.758*** 0.777
[0.0165] [0.192] [0.0223] [0.261] [0.0380] [0.444]
308 -0.0442*** 0.632*** 0.464 -0.195*** 2.900*** 0.714 -0.239*** 3.532*** 0.681
[0.0109] [0.127] [0.0283] [0.331] [0.0375] [0.439]
309 -0.213*** 3.082*** 0.555 0 0 -0.213*** 3.082*** 0.555
[0.0438] [0.512] [0] [0] [0.0438] [0.512]
310 -0.0442*** 0.632*** 0.464 -0.0571*** 0.810*** 0.433 -0.101*** 1.442*** 0.461
[0.0109] [0.127] [0.0150] [0.175] [0.0251] [0.294]
311 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
312 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
313 0 0 -0.253*** 3.866*** 0.788 -0.253*** 3.866*** 0.788
[0] [0] [0.0301] [0.352] [0.0301] [0.352]
314 -0.249*** 3.779*** 0.722 -0.0169 0.359 0.042 -0.266*** 4.139*** 0.725
[0.0355] [0.415] [0.0185] [0.217] [0.0376] [0.439]
315 0 0 -0.287*** 4.584*** 0.877 -0.287*** 4.584*** 0.877
[0] [0] [0.0246] [0.288] [0.0246] [0.288]
316 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
317 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
318 0 0 -0.156*** 2.273*** 0.617 -0.156*** 2.273*** 0.617
[0] [0] [0.0281] [0.329] [0.0281] [0.329]
319 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
320 -0.125*** 1.866*** 0.706 -0.222*** 3.411*** 0.804 -0.347*** 5.277*** 0.79
[0.0185] [0.216] [0.0252] [0.294] [0.0411] [0.480]
321 -0.0584*** 0.870*** 0.614 0 0 -0.0584*** 0.870*** 0.614
[0.0106] [0.124] [0] [0] [0.0106] [0.124]
322 -0.218*** 3.229*** 0.692 -0.0506* 0.983*** 0.149 -0.269*** 4.212*** 0.804
[0.0334] [0.390] [0.0277] [0.324] [0.0305] [0.356]
323 -0.0961*** 1.390*** 0.541 -0.0636*** 0.970*** 0.668 -0.160*** 2.359*** 0.659
[0.0203] [0.237] [0.0103] [0.120] [0.0264] [0.308]
324 -0.243*** 3.667*** 0.759 -0.257*** 3.952*** 0.809 -0.500*** 7.619*** 0.799
[0.0314] [0.367] [0.0287] [0.335] [0.0575] [0.673]
325 0 0 -0.292*** 4.541*** 0.833 -0.292*** 4.541*** 0.833
[0] [0] [0.0300] [0.351] [0.0300] [0.351]
326 0 0 -0.231*** 3.455*** 0.727 -0.231*** 3.455*** 0.727
[0] [0] [0.0325] [0.380] [0.0325] [0.380]
327 0 0 -0.0792*** 1.126*** 0.453 -0.0792*** 1.126*** 0.453
[0] [0] [0.0200] [0.233] [0.0200] [0.233]
mean -0.0609 0.904 -0.113 1.741 -0.174 2.645
s.d. (0.0834) (1.247) (0.107) (1.649) (0.129) (1.985)
Notes:
Obs = 21
Standard errors in brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TPPC Punishment TPPC Compensation TPPC Total Decision
 
 
Table 3.A6 Slopes of Individual Intervention Curves in TPPC  
(Dictator’s Transfer [0, 20]) 
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 subject coef cons R2 subject coef cons R2
101 0 0 201 0 1
[0] [0] [0] [0]
102 -0.173*** 1.318*** 0.694 202 -0.345*** 4.727*** 0.938
[0.0382] [0.226] [0.0297] [0.176]
103 -0.582*** 5.545*** 0.918 203 -0.345*** 2.818*** 0.88
[0.0578] [0.342] [0.0424] [0.251]
104 -0.182*** 2.364*** 0.769 204 -0.500*** 5.227*** 0.976
[0.0332] [0.196] [0.0262] [0.155]
105 -0.0909** 0.727*** 0.417 205 -0.327*** 5.273*** 0.939
[0.0359] [0.212] [0.0278] [0.164]
106 -0.500*** 3.864*** 0.796 206 0 0
[0.0844] [0.499] [0] [0]
107 0 0 207 -0.236*** 3.636*** 0.573
[0] [0] [0.0680] [0.402]
108 0 0 208 -0.382*** 4.818*** 0.948
[0] [0] [0.0297] [0.176]
109 0.0636 1.136 0.027 209 -0.455*** 5.364*** 0.912
[0.128] [0.759] [0.0469] [0.278]
110 -0.500*** 4.773*** 0.976 210 0 0
[0.0262] [0.155] [0] [0]
111 -0.136*** 1.136*** 0.75 211 -0.200*** 4.727*** 0.712
[0.0262] [0.155] [0.0424] [0.251]
112 -0.500*** 5.227*** 0.976 212 -0.282*** 2.591*** 0.907
[0.0262] [0.155] [0.0302] [0.178]
113 -0.500*** 3.864*** 0.796 213 0 0
[0.0844] [0.499] [0] [0]
114 -0.500*** 3.864*** 0.796 214 0 1
[0.0844] [0.499] [0] [0]
115 0 0 215 -0.500*** 7.227*** 0.976
[0] [0] [0.0262] [0.155]
116 0 0 216 -0.500*** 5.227*** 0.976
[0] [0] [0.0262] [0.155]
117 -0.245*** 4.045*** 0.868 217 -1 10 1
[0.0319] [0.189] [0] [0]
118 -0.200** 2*** 0.44 218 -0.327*** 3.182*** 0.926
[0.0752] [0.445] [0.0309] [0.183]
119 0 0 219 -0.345*** 4.727*** 0.938
[0] [0] [0.0297] [0.176]
120 -0.500*** 3.864*** 0.796 220 -0.418*** 4.727*** 0.936
[0.0844] [0.499] [0.0364] [0.215]
121 -0.964*** 9.909*** 0.955 221 -0.445*** 5.227*** 0.909
[0.0694] [0.410] [0.0468] [0.277]
222 -0.327*** 5*** 0.939
[0.0278] [0.164]
223 -1 10 1
[0] [0]
224 -0.282*** 2.136*** 0.717
[0.0590] [0.349]
225 -0.136*** 3.227*** 0.75
[0.0262] [0.155]
226 0.0364 0.545* 0.067
[0.0454] [0.268]
227 -0.355*** 3.318*** 0.939
[0.0302] [0.178]
mean -0.262 2.554 -0.321 3.916
s.d. (0.275) (2.575) (0.261) (2.636) 
Notes:
Obs = 11
Standard errors in brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TPP Punishment TPC Compensation
 
 
Table 3.A7 Slopes of Individual Intervention Curves in TPP and TPC 
(Dictator’s Transfer [0, 10]) 
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 subject coef cons R2 coef cons R2 coef cons R2
301 -0.218*** 1.636*** 0.6 0 0 -0.218*** 1.636*** 0.6
[0.0594] [0.351] [0] [0] [0.0594] [0.351]
302 -0.0455 0.318* 0.25 -0.218*** 2.727*** 0.8 -0.264*** 3.045*** 0.751
[0.0262] [0.155] [0.0364] [0.215] [0.0506] [0.299]
303 0 0 -0.127*** 1*** 0.7 -0.127*** 1*** 0.7
[0] [0] [0.0278] [0.164] [0.0278] [0.164]
304 -0.0727 0.636** 0.267 -0.318*** 3.409*** 0.817 -0.391*** 4.045*** 0.804
[0.0402] [0.238] [0.0503] [0.297] [0.0644] [0.381]
305 0 0 -0.436*** 4.909*** 0.944 -0.436*** 4.909*** 0.944
[0] [0] [0.0353] [0.209] [0.0353] [0.209]
306 -0.264*** 2.500*** 0.793 -0.100* 1.318*** 0.302 -0.364*** 3.818*** 0.727
[0.0448] [0.265] [0.0506] [0.299] [0.0742] [0.439]
307 -0.245*** 2.409*** 0.868 -0.327*** 3.636*** 0.842 -0.573*** 6.045*** 0.867
[0.0319] [0.189] [0.0473] [0.280] [0.0749] [0.443]
308 -0.127*** 1*** 0.7 -0.455*** 4.091*** 0.962 -0.582*** 5.091*** 0.939
[0.0278] [0.164] [0.0303] [0.179] [0.0492] [0.291]
309 -0.582*** 4.727*** 0.816 0 0 -0.582*** 4.727*** 0.816
[0.0921] [0.545] [0] [0] [0.0921] [0.545]
310 -0.127*** 1*** 0.7 -0.173*** 1.318*** 0.694 -0.300*** 2.318*** 0.726
[0.0278] [0.164] [0.0382] [0.226] [0.0614] [0.363]
311 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
312 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
313 0 0 -0.500*** 5.045*** 0.957 -0.500*** 5.045*** 0.957
[0] [0] [0.0352] [0.208] [0.0352] [0.208]
314 -0.518*** 5.045*** 0.851 0.0636 0.0455 0.098 -0.455*** 5.091*** 0.676
[0.0724] [0.428] [0.0644] [0.381] [0.105] [0.621]
315 0 0 -0.373*** 5.136*** 0.944 -0.373*** 5.136*** 0.944
[0] [0] [0.0302] [0.178] [0.0302] [0.178]
316 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
317 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
318 0 0 -0.409*** 3.409*** 0.896 -0.409*** 3.409*** 0.896
[0] [0] [0.0465] [0.275] [0.0465] [0.275]
319 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
320 -0.282*** 2.591*** 0.907 -0.418*** 4.364*** 0.953 -0.700*** 6.955*** 0.985
[0.0302] [0.178] [0.0309] [0.183] [0.0289] [0.171]
321 -0.136*** 1.227*** 0.75 0 0 -0.136*** 1.227*** 0.75
[0.0262] [0.155] [0] [0] [0.0262] [0.155]
322 -0.527*** 4.636*** 0.956 0.1 0.409 0.123 -0.427*** 5.045*** 0.806
[0.0378] [0.224] [0.0888] [0.525] [0.0698] [0.413]
323 -0.264*** 2.136*** 0.793 -0.127*** 1.273*** 0.7 -0.391*** 3.409*** 0.898
[0.0448] [0.265] [0.0278] [0.164] [0.0440] [0.260]
324 -0.518*** 4.955*** 0.967 -0.482*** 5.045*** 0.962 -1 10 1
[0.0319] [0.189] [0.0319] [0.189] [0] [0]
325 0 0 -0.500*** 5.591*** 0.951 -0.500*** 5.591*** 0.951
[0] [0] [0.0377] [0.223] [0.0377] [0.223]
326 0 0 -0.527*** 4.818*** 0.967 -0.527*** 4.818*** 0.967
[0] [0] [0.0326] [0.193] [0.0326] [0.193]
327 0 0 -0.236*** 1.818*** 0.719 -0.236*** 1.818*** 0.719
[0] [0] [0.0492] [0.291] [0.0492] [0.291]
mean -0.145 1.289 -0.206 2.199 -0.352 3.488
s.d. (0.193) (1.743) (0.209) (2.099) (0.245) (2.510) 
Notes:
Obs = 11
Standard errors in brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TPPC Punishment TPPC Compensation TPPC Total Decision
 
 
Table 3.A8 Slopes of Individual Intervention Curves in TPPC  
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Figure 3.A6 Total Spending on Intervention in TPPC 
 140
 6.2 Experimental Instructions 
Instructions for the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) Treatment  
 
General Instructions 
Welcome to this study! 
This is a study on decision making and it will last for about 1 hour. The study 
will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. Neither administrators nor other 
participants will be able to link your decisions to your personal identity. Please 
rest assured that your anonymity as a decision maker will be strictly preserved.  
If you have questions at any time during the study, please raise your hand and 
we will attend to you privately. Communication between participants is strictly 
prohibited. Furthermore, please do not use the computer for any other purpose 
than participating in this study. Please turn your mobile into silence mode as 
well. 
In this study, you will make a series of decisions in a game. Your payoffs from 
participating in this study are composed of two parts. First, you will receive a 
show-up fee regardless of your decisions. Second, your earnings in the game 
are determined by your own decisions and the decision of others. It is crucial 
for you to understand how to play the game. 
The Game-Specific Instructions 
The game will be played in groups of three. In each group, there is a Player A, 
a Player B and a Player C. 
Player A will split $20 with Player B. That is, Player A will decide how to split 
$20, and Player A and Player B will be paid according to Player A’s decision. 
Player B has no say in the decision and has to accept Player A’s decision. 
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 Player C observes Player A’s decision and can choose to punish Player A and 
reduce Player A’s payoff. Player C has an initial endowment of $15. Each 
dollar spent on punishment will reduce Player A’s payoff by $2.  
Player C cannot affect Player B’s payoff. 
You will play the game for three rounds. In each round, you will be randomly 
grouped with two other participants in the lab. In every round you will be 
randomly re-matched. That means your group composition will change from 
round to round. You will be assigned to one role (A, or B, or C) for each round, 
and in the next two rounds you will play different roles. So you will assume 
each of these three roles only once. 
At the end of each period, you will not be informed of the other players’ 
decisions. You will know what happens in each round when all three rounds 
have been played. By then, the computer will randomly choose one round as a 
binding round. Your payoff will be determined by the decisions made by you 
and your group members in that particular round. All three rounds are equally 
likely to be the binding round, so make thoughtful decision in all three rounds. 








 Here is the summary of roles of each Player: 
 
Player A 
• Split $20 with Player B anonymously and independently 
• Can be punished by Player C 
• Payoff: the amount Player A keeps after the split minus the punishment 
imposed by Player C      
 




 Player B 
• Accept Player A’s split decision. This is Player B’s payoff. 
 





• Player C is endowed with $15. Based on the decision of Player A, 
Player C can choose to punish Player A. 
• Each dollar Player C spent on punishment will reduce Player A’s 
payoff by two dollars. 
• Payoff: $15 minus the amount spent on punishment. 
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 A sample screen of Player C:  
 
 
For player C, there are 21 scenarios. Please indicate how much you want to 
spend out of $15 endowment to punish A in each of these scenarios. Note that 
each dollar spent on punishment will reduce Player A's payoff by two dollars. 
You can insert any whole number from 0 to 15 given that you cannot reduce 
player A's payoff to negative. After you made your decisions in all scenarios 
shown above, your decisions will be matched against Player A’s actual 
allocation to Player B. Your payoff as Player C would be $15 minus the 
amount you spent on punishing Player A at that particular scenario. You don’t 
know which scenario is going to happen; hence you should make your 
decisions in all scenarios carefully.  
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 Instructions for the Third-Party Compensation (TPC) Treatment  
 
General Instructions 
Welcome to this study! 
This is a study on decision making and it will last for about 1 hour. The study 
will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. Neither administrators nor other 
participants will be able to link your decisions to your personal identity. Please 
rest assured that your anonymity as a decision maker will be strictly preserved.  
If you have questions at any time during the study, please raise your hand and 
we will attend to you privately. Communication between participants is strictly 
prohibited. Furthermore, please do not use the computer for any other purpose 
than participating in this study. Please turn your mobile into silence mode as 
well. 
In this study, you will make a series of decisions in a game. Your payoffs from 
participating in this study are composed of two parts. First, you will receive a 
show-up fee regardless of your decisions. Second, your earnings in the game 
are determined by your own decisions and the decision of others. It is crucial 
for you to understand how to play the game. 
The Game-Specific Instructions 
 
The game will be played in groups of three. In each group, there is a Player A, 
a Player B and a Player C. 
Player A will split $20 with Player B. That is, Player A will decide how to split 
$20, and Player A and Player B will be paid according to Player A’s decision. 
Player B has no say in the decision and has to accept Player A’s decision. 
Player C observes Player A’s decision and can choose to compensate Player B, 
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 that would increase Player B’s payoff. Player C has an initial endowment of 
$15. Each dollar spent on compensating Player B will increase Player B’s 
payoff by $2.  
Player C cannot affect Player A’s payoff. 
You will play the game for three rounds. In each round, you will be randomly 
grouped with two other participants in the lab. In every round you will be 
randomly re-matched. That means your group composition will change from 
round to round. You will be assigned to one role (A, or B, or C) for each round, 
and in the next two rounds you will play different roles. So you will assume 
each of these three roles only once. 
At the end of each period, you will not be informed of the other players’ 
decisions. You will know what happens in each round when all three rounds 
have been played. By then, the computer will randomly choose one round as a 
binding round. Your payoff will be determined by the decisions made by you 
and your group members in that particular round. All three rounds are equally 
likely to be the binding round, so make thoughtful decision in all three rounds. 
The following graph describes the roles of each player. 





 Here is the summary of roles of each Player: 
 
Player A 
• Split $20 with Player B anonymously and independently 
• Payoff: the amount Player A keeps after the split. 
 




Player B  
• Accept Player A’s split decision.  
• Could be compensated by Player C 
• Payoff: The amount Player B receives from Player A after the split plus 
the compensation from Player C 
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Player C  
• Player C is endowed with $15. Based on the decision of Player A, 
Player C can choose compensate Player B. 
• Each dollar Player C spent on compensation will increase Player B’s 
payoff by two dollars. 
• Payoff: $15 minus the amount spent on compensation 
 
 149
 A sample screen of Player C: 
 
 
For player C, there are 21 scenarios. Please indicate how much you want to 
spend out of $15 endowment to compensate B in each of these scenarios. 
Note that each dollar spent on compensation will increase Player B's payoff by 
two dollars. You can insert any whole number from 0 to 15.  
After you made your decisions in all scenarios shown above, your decisions 
will be matched against Player A’s actual allocation to Player B. Your payoff 
as Player C would be $15 minus the amount you spent on compensating 
Player B at that particular scenario. You don’t know which scenario is going to 
happen; hence you should make your decisions in all scenarios carefully.  
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Welcome to this study! 
This is a study on decision making and it will last for about 1 hour. The study 
will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. Neither administrators nor other 
participants will be able to link your decisions to your personal identity. Please 
rest assured that your anonymity as a decision maker will be strictly preserved.  
If you have questions at any time during the study, please raise your hand and 
we will attend to you privately. Communication between participants is strictly 
prohibited. Furthermore, please do not use the computer for any other purpose 
than participating in this study. Please turn your mobile into silence mode as 
well. 
In this study, you will make a series of decisions in a game. Your payoffs from 
participating in this study are composed of two parts. First, you will receive a 
show-up fee regardless of your decisions. Second, your earnings in the game 
are determined by your own decisions and the decision of others. It is crucial 
for you to understand how to play the game. 
  
The Game-Specific Instructions 
The game will be played in groups of three. In each group, there is a Player A, 
a Player B and a Player C. 
Player A will split $20 with Player B. That is, Player A will decide how to split 
$20, and Player A and Player B will be paid according to Player A’s decision. 
Player B has no say in the decision and has to accept Player A’s decision. 
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 Player C observes Player A’s allocation decision to Player B and can choose 1) 
to punish Player A and reduce Player A’s payoff, and/or 2) to compensate 
Player B that would increase Player B’s payoff. Player C has an initial 
endowment of $15. Each dollar spent on punishment will reduce Player A’s 
payoff by $2. Similarly, each dollar spent on compensation will increase 
Player B’s payoff by $2. 
You will play the game for three rounds. In each round, you will be randomly 
grouped with two other participants in the lab. In every round you will be 
randomly re-matched. That means your group composition will change from 
round to round. You will be assigned to one role (A, or B, or C) for each round, 
and in the next two rounds you will play different roles. So you will assume 
each of these three roles only once. 
At the end of each period, you will not be informed of the other players’ 
decisions. You will know what happens in each round when all three rounds 
have been played. By then, the computer will randomly choose one round as a 
binding round. Your payoff will be determined by the decisions made by you 
and your group members in that particular round. All three rounds are equally 
likely to be the binding round, so make thoughtful decision in all three rounds. 






Punish  Compensate 
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 Here is the summary of roles of each Player: 
 
Player A 
• Split $20 with Player B anonymously and independently 
• Can be punished by Player C 
• Payoff: the amount Player A keeps after the split minus the punishment 
imposed by Player C 
 




• Accept Player A’s split decision.  
• Can be compensated by Player C 
• Payoff: The amount Player B receives from Player A after the split plus 
the compensation from Player C 
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 A sample screen of Player B: 
 
 
Player C  
• Player C is endowed with $15. Based on the decision of Player A, 
Player C can choose to punish Player A and/or compensate Player B. 
• Each dollar Player C spent on punishment will reduce Player A’s 
payoff by $2, and each dollar Player C spent on compensation will 
increase Player B’s payoff by $2. 




 A sample screen of Player C:   
 
 
For player C, there are 21 scenarios. Please indicate how much you want to 
spend out of $15 endowment to punish A and/or compensate B in each of 
these scenarios. Note that each dollar spent on punishment will reduce Player 
A's payoff by two dollars and each dollar spent on compensation will increase 
Player B's payoff by two dollars. You can insert any whole number from 0 to 
15 given that you cannot reduce A's payoff to negative.  
 
After you made your decisions in all scenarios shown above, your decisions 
will be matched against Player A’s actual allocation to Player B. Your payoff 
as Player C would be $15 minus the amount you spent on punishing Player A 
and/ or compensating Player B at that particular scenario. You don’t know 










As preferences are the ranking over various bundles of goods based on their 
provided utility, social preferences represents the ranking over various bundles 
of allocations between oneself and others (Camerer and Fehr, 2003). Social 
preferences govern the trade-offs between the allocations of material payoffs 
to oneself and others. Ample evidence from the laboratory and fields verify the 
prevalence of social preferences. In the literature, social preferences are 
identified in various forms such as, but not limited to, altruism, reciprocity, 
inequality aversion, and conditional cooperation (Camerer and Fehr, 2003). 
The existing studies on social preferences mainly focus on two areas. One 
area is on a certain type of social preferences where each type is treated in an 
isolated way. Specific experimental games are designed to elicit certain forms 
of social preferences. For example, experimental economists use the dictator 
game to measure altruism, use the trust game to measure positive reciprocity, 
use the ultimatum game to measure negative reciprocity, and use social 
dilemma games to measure cooperation etc. Another area is the interaction 
between social preferences and monetary incentives. In these studies, typically 
only one form of social preferences is considered or social preferences are 
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 treated as an aggregated basket (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Bowels et al., 
2012; Ariely et al., 2009). There is another important area that has not been 
extensively addressed yet, i.e., the relations between different forms of social 
preferences. This interaction is not uncommon given the fact that a pro-social 
individual would usually participate in various forms of pro-social activities, 
and the incentives behind could be conflicting or compatible. 
Consider the following example. Jane was benefited from the alumni fund 
in her university days, and now she is considering giving back to this alumni 
fund as an appreciation for the help received. Meanwhile, an earthquake 
occurred at the other corner of the world and help is badly needed. Jane is 
convinced that she should support. However, she has a limit budget for giving 
and private consumptions. Given the existing option for donating to the alumni 
fund, how would the additional option of donating to the disaster relief project 
affect the overall giving decision? What we are interested in this scenario is, 
first, if the additional donation option would crowd out the allocation to the 
existing option, and second, if the total donation amount would change with 
the introduction of an additional option. 
To answer these questions, we introduce the concept of "intra-social 
preferences". Moving one-step further from the existing understanding of 
social preferences, we examine the trade-offs one will make between the 
allocations to oneself and others, and between the allocations to several 
different others. By "several", we mean that there is more than one recipient; 
and by "different" we mean that the giving to each recipient could be triggered 
by different forms of social preferences. As in the above example, both giving 
to the alumni fund and the giving to the disaster relief project are a sacrifice of 
one's own material benefits. And the difference is that the former is out of 
reciprocity, and the latter is out of altruism. When there are various channels 
for individuals to express their social preferences, how would they respond? 
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study on such interaction of 
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 different forms of social preferences. 
This paper is in line with the studies on individual's preferences for giving 
which started from the two-person dictator game. In a two-person dictator 
game, the dictator allocates a sum of money between self and another person. 
A robust result is that subjects would give 20% of their endowment to this 
anonymous other person (Camerer, 2003). Fisman et al. (2007) extended the 
two-person dictator game to a third-person dictator game by introducing one 
more identical recipient. The extra recipient is as weak as the existing one in 
influencing the dictator's allocation decision. They found that the presence of 
an additional other did not generate a proportional increase in the overall level 
of giving: a mean of 25% of total expenditure was given to others. 
Furthermore, they found that on average others were treated identically. There 
was no bias toward either one of the recipients. 
This paper can be considered as an extension of Fisman et al. (2007). For 
each decision maker, there would be two non-identical recipients who relate to 
the decision maker in different ways. In particular, one recipient triggers the 
giving out of altruism and the other triggers the giving out of reciprocity. In 
contrast to Fisman et al. (2007), we evaluate how individuals would respond to 
the introduction of a second beneficiary who is not identical from the existing 
one. In other words, we examine how individuals make trade-off between self 
and others, and between these two different others. The first trade-off is 
conventionally known as "social preferences" and the second trade-off we coin 
it as "intra-social preferences". 
The result shows that altruism and reciprocity, as two different types of 
social preferences, are of similar level of strength in motivating individuals to 
give. Furthermore, there is a minor but insignificant crowding-out effect 
between these two motives, which suggests a limited trade-off between these 
two forms of social preferences. Last, subjects have a fixed budget for the 
allocation to others regardless of the identity of the latter. This is the first study 
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 that focuses on the relation between different preferences for it allows more 
than one type of social preferences within a unified framework to influence an 
individual's pro-social decision. This study would shed new light on 
individuals' pro-social behavior and the interaction of incentives underlying 
the pro-social behavior. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the 
experiment design and Section 3, the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design 
In this experiment, we examine the budget allocation decisions motivated by 
two forms of social preferences, namely, reciprocity and altruism. An altruistic 
or a reciprocal individual tend to sacrifice their own private benefits for the 
welfare of others, even without the expectation for future benefits from the 
beneficiaries. The difference between these two motives lies in the relations 
between the giver and the recipient. Altruistic giving is an unconditional 
sacrifice for the welfare of others, towards whom the individual is not obliged 
to. While for reciprocal giving, the recipient is someone who has benefited the 
individual beforehand. It is a favor in return. 
We have three between-subject treatments in this experiment: a trust game, 
a donation game and a combined trust-donation game (Figure 4.1). Although 
there are two players in the trust game, we focus on the behaviors of the 
second player (Player B) and use the strategy method to elicit the data of their 
decisions. We have 24 (pairs of) subjects in each treatment. Each game is 
played once and each subject is assigned one role to play the game. 
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  BsendA repay
Treatment 1: The Trust Game
A Charity donatesend BTreatment 2: The Donation Game
A Charity donate
send
repay BTreatment 3: The Trust-Donation Game  
 
Figure 4.1 The Experimental Design 
 
The first treatment is a trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Both the trustor, 
Player A and the trustee, Player B are endowed with S$10 as their initial 
endowment. The equal endowment between Player A and Player B is to 
eliminate the concern of inequality aversion when the former makes any 
transfer to the latter. Player A can send any amount as multiples of S$1 to 
Player B, and this amount will be tripled in its value when it reaches Player B. 
Player B then decides how much she wants to return to Player A. Player B 
makes a decision plan conditional on all possible sent amounts from Player A. 
Payment is made according to the realized scenario. 
The second treatment is dictator game, or a donation game. The dictator, 
Player B, is notified that a Player A has sent a certain amount to her and thus 
her endowment is enlarged. Player B decides how much of this enlarged 
endowment she would like to send to the recipient using the strategy method 
before they know their realized new budget. The recipient of this dictator 
game is a real charity and the decision is framed as a "donation". The chosen 
charity is known as "Doctor without Borders", a secular, non-government, 
non-profit organization that provides urgent medical care in countries to 
victims of war and natural disaster. A two-minute video clip about their recent 
project from YouTube is shown to the subjects before they make any decisions. 
At the end of the experimental session, the experimenters calculate the total 
donations and make the online transfer to the charity based Player A's decision 
from the trust-game treatment. This process is known beforehand and is 
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 witnessed by all subjects. Subjects are paid according to the realized decisions 
as well. 
The third treatment is a mixture of the trust game and the donation game. 
Player B, using the strategy method, indicates from the new endowment how 
much she would like to return to Player A, and how much to donate to the 
charity. The charity is introduced to the subjects in the same way as in 
donation-game treatment, so is the online donation process. The only 
difference from the above treatments is that Player B is making a joint 
decision here, where two different motives of giving are on the strain. This 
treatment allows us to evaluate the strength of the reciprocal motive and the 
altruistic motive as a decision and measure the crowding-out effect of each 
motive when compared with the other two treatments. 
Among the three treatments, we first ran the third treatment, the 
trust-donation game and used Player As’ decisions for the other two treatments. 
This is to ensure that the distribution of the Player As’ sent amounts in all 
three treatments are the same, which is important for us to have clean 
between-treatment comparisons of Player Bs’ decisions. 
3. Experimental Results 
Player A in the trust-donation game sent an average amount of S$5.13 to their 
paired Player B. Their decisions increased the endowment of Player B to about 
S$25 from S$10, the endowment. Table 4.1 summarizes the statistics of the 




Treatment Role Obs Female Send Repay Donate Total Payoff
1. Trust Game B 24 50.00% 4.979 4.979 20.396
(5.111) (5.111) (7.558)
2. Donation Game B 24 41.67% 3.275 3.275 22.100
(4.192) (4.192) (10.410)
3. Trust-Donation Game A 24 58.33% 5.125 5.125 9.854
(3.327) (3.327) (3.783)
B 24 50.00% 3.425 2.496 5.921 19.450
(4.684) (3.110) (6.215) (9.363)
Table 4.1 Summary of Statistics of the Realized Decisions 
 
Result 1. The altruism motive is as strong as the reciprocity motive in 
soliciting individual's giving. 
 
Both the reciprocity motive and the altruism motive motivate subjects to 
sacrifice direct personal gains for the benefits of others. They differ in the 
relation between the giver and recipient. In particular, the recipient is someone 
who has previously benefited the giver, while the recipient of the altruistic 
giving should have no direct relations with the giver. 
Table 4.1 shows the realized decisions of Player B given Player A's sent 
amount. We can see that although reciprocal giving is slightly higher than 
altruistic giving, the differences between these two types of giving are not 
significant. This is true for both separate and joint decisions. In particular, 
Player B on average sends back S$4.98 to Player A in the trust game, and 
donates S$3.28 to the charity (p = 0.5173). When decisions are joint, they send 
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Figure 4.2 Reciprocal Giving and Altruistic Giving 
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 The relation between the reciprocal giving and the altruistic giving is more 
evident when we look at the decision plans of Player B from the three 
treatments (Figure 4.2). From Figure 4.2, we see that connected lines of Player 
B's donation and returned amount overlap each other. When decisions are 
separate, donation is slightly higher than reciprocity when Player A's entrusted 
amount is particularly low. However, there is no significant differences from 
any pair-wise comparisons conditional on Player A's entrusted amount. 
Most of the previous studies on social distance concluded that the shorter 
the social distance between the giver and the recipient, the more generous the 
giver. In these studies, a short social distance is defined as a less anonymous 
setting between the giver and the recipient (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; 
Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Different from 
this identifiability-based social distance, the social distance in our experiment 
is based on "the degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist within a social 
interaction" (Hoffman et al., 1996). In this sense, the social distance between 
Player B and Player A in a trust game is shorter than that between Player B 
and the charity. However, from the above results, there is no evidence of the 
impact of the reciprocity-based social distance on subject's pro-social 
behaviors. Altruism and reciprocity are equivalent in their strength of 
motivating subjects to give. 
 
Result 2. There is no significant crowding-out effect between altruism and 
reciprocity. 
 
The crowding-out effect is measured by the reduce of giving out of a certain 
motive between when it is the only motive of giving and when there is an 
additional motive that calls for giving. Crowding-out takes place when 
subjects have a certain allocation for others, given a fixed total budget. The 
comparisons between the giving out of altruism and the giving out of 
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 reciprocity measures how individuals allocate resources between different 
others, and the crowding-out effects suggest how individuals allocate 
resources between others and themselves. In particular, we compare the giving 
amount out of reciprocity or altruism when it is the single decision and when it 
is part of the joint decision. Thus, we evaluate how an additional and different 
giving option affects the current decision. 
From Table 4.1, reciprocal giving is S$4.98 when it is the only decision in 
the trust game, and with the additional donation option in the trust-donation 
game, it is reduced to S$3.43. Thus, altruism crowds out reciprocity by 
31.12%. However, there is no significant difference between these two 
reciprocal giving (p = 0.265). Similarly, reciprocity crowds out altruism by 
23.79%. The difference of donation in the donation game and that in the 
trust-donation game is not significant (p =0.3964). Figure 4.3 shows that for 
both reciprocal giving and altruistic giving, the amount is higher when it is a 
single decision than when it is part of the joint decision. However, the 
differences are not significant from pair-wise comparisons. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that the altruistic giving crowds out more reciprocal giving than 
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Figure 4.3 The Crowding-Out Effect 
 
The above results suggest that in the hypothetical scenario in the 
introduction, the giving allocated to the alumni fund would be lowered to a 
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 certain level when there is an additional donation option. However, the 
decrease in giving is not statistically significant. A recent study on the 
expenditure substitution in charitable giving shows that evident substitution 
exists among large givers and only between certain types for causes (Reinstein, 
2011). Given the nature of the game, that fact that most of subjects are 
considered as small givers and this could be a reason that the crowding-out 
effects of an additional option is not highly significant. 
 
Result 3. Subjects have a fixed budget to allocate between themselves and 
others regardless of the identity of the latter. 
  
We compare subject's allocation to others to examine whether the different 
motives of giving would affect their general decisions of budget allocation. We 
find that Player B in all the three treatments has the same budget allocated to 
the others, regardless who the "others" are or how many "others" there are. 
The total amount allocated to others is S$4.98 in the trust game, S$3.28 in the 
donation game, and S$5.92 in the trust-donation game. Mann-Whitney tests 
show that none of the pair-wise comparisons are significant (p12=0.5173, p13 
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Figure 4.4 Total Allocation to Others 
 
The result from the decision plans is consistent with that of the realized 
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 decision that there are no differences in giving to others between these three 
treatments. Panel A of Figure 4.4 shows that the total budget allocated to 
"others" is higher in the joint decision treatment than in the separate decision 
treatments, but the differences are not significant for most of the pair-wise 
comparisons (see Table 4.A1 and 4.A2 in the Appendix). Panel B shows the 
decision rates in the three treatments. We can see that as the endowment 
increases, the budget for others increases as well, although the slopes are much 
lower than those of the absolute amount. As a result, there are no significant 
differences in the payoffs of Player B between treatments. From Table 4.1, 
Player B earned an average of S$20 in the three treatments. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relation of two different forms of social 
preferences, reciprocity and altruism, in a laboratory experiment. In three 
between-subject treatments, we solicit individual's giving out of the motives of 
reciprocity and altruism separately and jointly. We find that reciprocity and 
altruism are equivalent in their strength of motivation giving. Subjects do not 
treatment non-identical others differently. Furthermore, when there is an 
additional option of giving, subjects makes adjustment in their allocation to 
others, and they keep a fixed amount to themselves regardless of the how 
many others there are or who the others are. 
The results suggest that in the simple budget allocation exercise, subjects 
are consistent in their "social preferences" decisions. The bundle of the 
material payoffs between self and others that rank highest are identical even 
the allocation decisions are triggered by different motives. One the other hand, 
there is only weak evidence of "intra-social preferences" for the trade-offs 
between reciprocal giving and altruistic giving are not significant from this 
experimentt. 
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 It should be pointed out that, in this study, we just focus the attention on the 
interaction between altruism and reciprocity, as a tentative exploration in the 
area of "intra-social preferences". As we know, there are many more other 
forms of social preferences related to individual's other-regarding decisions. 
Whether our results can be generalized remains uncertain. It calls for further 
experimental studies to unveil the relations between other types of social 
preferences, such as inequality aversion, conditional cooperation and so on. 
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 5. Appendix 
5.1 Additional Tables 
Entrusted
Amount










mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d) mean (s.d)
0 3.750 6.875 10.625 0.417 10.333
(11.349) (14.582) (25.035) (2.041) (15.703)
1 7.958 9.833 17.792 6.458 14.708
(12.736) (15.611) (27.332) (8.005) (19.084)
2 10.917 11.542 22.458 15.667 20.875
(13.663) (15.992) (27.055) (14.499) (26.884)
3 16.792 15.542 32.333 23.625 27.250
(17.248) (17.891) (29.778) (21.451) (35.241)
4 19.750 22.458 42.208 31.458 35.708
(19.229) (26.773) (38.466) (27.166) (43.891)
5 30.000 29.792 59.792 39.167 41.292
(30.324) (33.895) (47.514) (34.220) (49.458)
6 35.458 32.708 68.167 49.792 48.500
(36.497) (36.415) (52.678) (41.270) (54.208)
7 41.542 44.125 85.667 57.500 56.917
(40.503) (54.539) (67.636) (46.927) (64.078)
8 46.583 46.792 93.375 68.750 67.458
(46.734) (59.128) (74.357) (55.448) (72.791)
9 52.042 53.000 105.042 77.917 79.875
(52.121) (66.558) (83.200) (59.453) (91.427)
10 61.458 62.958 124.417 93.958 94.250
(58.132) (74.810) (93.910) (63.844) (112.461)
Total 29.659 30.511 60.170 42.246 45.197
(38.795) (46.315) (66.599) (48.398) (64.814)
obs 24 24 24 24 24  




TG vs TD TDG TDG vs TG TDG vs DG TDG vs TG TDG vs DG
0 0.000 0.026 0.273 0.127 0.0195 0.159
1 0.124 0.420 0.903 0.241 0.147 0.924
2 0.966 0.778 0.265 0.243 0.644 0.729
3 0.859 0.890 0.239 0.381 0.504 0.434
4 0.811 0.763 0.101 0.406 0.513 0.531
5 0.803 0.833 0.285 0.457 0.145 0.253
6 0.656 0.591 0.226 0.244 0.178 0.396
7 0.583 0.896 0.293 0.329 0.134 0.247
8 0.590 0.533 0.190 0.206 0.264 0.396
9 0.584 0.672 0.127 0.206 0.287 0.358
10 0.535 0.688 0.0755 0.182 0.222 0.296
Entrusted
Amount
Return vs Donation Total Decision
 
Table 4.A2 Between-Treatment Mann-Whitney Tests 
 
5.2 Experimental Instructions 




Welcome to this study on decision making!  
Before we start, please turn off your mobile phone and follow this instruction 
sheet closely while we are reading it out loud. It is crucial for you to 
understand the game before it starts. 
General Information 
In this study, there is a one-round decision making exercise which will last for 
about one hour.  
There are two players in the game, Player A and Player B. All Player As are 
placed in one room, and all Player Bs are placed in another room. Each player 
A will be randomly matched with a Player B to form a group by the computer. 
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 Player A and Player B in a group interact with each other during the session 
and their payoffs are determined by the decisions made by both sides. 
The study will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. The administrators can 
only identify you by the unique User ID you are assigned with. Participants 
will not be able to identify each other during and after the study as well. In 
other words, you will not know who your partner is in this study. Please rest 
assured that your anonymity as a decision maker is strictly preserved.  
The Game Structure 
In this room, all players are assigned the role as ‘Player A’. Both Player A and 
Player B begin with 100 points as their initial endowment. This game consists 
of two stages.   
Stage One  
In Stage One, as Player A, you will decide: How many points from your 
endowment you want to pass on to Player B. You can pass 0 point, 10 points, 
20 points, 30 points, 40 points, 50 points, 60 points, 70 points, 80 points, 90 
points or 100 points to Player B. The points you pass on to Player B will be 
TRIPLED in value when they reach Player B. You will keep the remaining 
points. 
Stage Two 
In Stage Two, Player B will decide how many points from his/her new 
endowment (the tripled points from you + the initial 100 endowment points) 
he/she wants to pass back to you. The points that Player B passes back to you 
will be added onto your earnings. Player B will keep the remaining points as 
his/her own earnings. 
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 Earnings from the Game 
Based on the above two stages, your earnings are calculated in this way:  
Your earnings =   + 100 endowment points  
−  points you pass on to Player B 
+  points Player B passes back to you 
The conversion rate for earnings is 10 points for 1 Singapore Dollar. You will 
be paid in cash at the end of the session privately. Please fill in the claim card 
with your ID and Password and bring it for payment collection. 
There will be a few control questions to test your understanding of the game 
before you proceed to the real decision. 
If you have any questions at this moment, please raise your hand and we will 








Welcome to this study on decision making!  
Before we start, please turn off your mobile phone and follow this instruction 
sheet closely while we are reading it out loud. It is crucial for you to 
understand the game before it starts. 
General Information 
In this study, there is a one-round decision making exercise which will last for 
about one hour.  
There are two players in the game, Player A and Player B. All Player As are 
placed in one room, and all Player Bs are placed in another room. Each player 
A will be randomly matched with a Player B to form a group by the computer. 
Player A and Player B in a group interact with each other during the session 
and their payoffs are determined by the decisions made by both sides. 
The study will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. The administrators can 
only identify you by the unique User ID you are assigned with. Participants 
will not be able to identify each other during and after the study as well. In 
other words, you will not know who your partner is in this study. Please rest 
assured that your anonymity as a decision maker is strictly preserved.  
The Game Structure 
In this room, all players are assigned the role of ‘Player B’. Both Player A and 
Player B begin with 100 points as the initial endowment. This game consists 
of two stages.   
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 Stage One  
In Stage One, Player A will decide how many points out of his/her given 
endowment he/she wants to pass on to you. Player A can pass 0 point, 10 
points, 20 points, 30 points, 40 points, 50 points, 60 points, 70 points, 80 
points, 90 points or 100 points to you. Player A will keep the remaining points 
not passed on to you. The points that Player A decides to pass on to you 
(Player B) will be TRIPLED in value when they reach you.  
Stage Two 
In Stage Two, you have the initial 100 points plus the TRIPLED points from 
Player A. as Player B, you have to decide: 
z How many points out of total points in your possession you want to 
pass back to Player A? These points will be added onto Player A’s 
earnings. 
z How many points out of total points in your possession you want to 
donate to a charity? We will give brief information about this chosen 
charity to you shortly. 
You will keep the remaining points after deducting the points you allocate in 
decision 1 and 2 above as your own earnings. 
You will make these decisions in a “planned” manner, which means you will 
make a complete “decision plan” conditional on Player A’s potential decisions, 
even before you know Player A’s actual decision. Once Player A has made 
his/her “pass on” decision, his (her) decision will be matched to your 
correspondence decision. You will then know how many points you received 
from Player A and the corresponding points you decide to pass back to Player 
 173
 given the amounts you received from Player A from your “decision plan” you 
have made earlier.  
Note that, Player A does not know that you have an option to donate to a 
charity. 
The Charity 
The charity chosen as the beneficiary of this study should you want to donate 
is a well-known international charitable organization “Doctors without 
Borders”.  
“Doctors without Borders” is a secular humanitarian-aid non-governmental 
organization best known for its projects in war-torn regions and developing 
countries facing endemic diseases. We will show you a short video clip 
about this charity.  
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of each individual donation you have made and 
donate this total amount online through internet. You will witness the whole 
process of donation, and know that it is you who make the contributions. We 
will show you the confirmation from “Doctors without Borders” on the 
screen. 
Earnings from the Game 
 
Based on the above two stages, your earnings are calculated in this way:  
Your earnings =   + 100 endowment points 
+ Three times the points passed to you from Player A 
−  Points you give back to Player A 
−  Points you donate to the charity  
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 The conversion rate for earnings is 10 points for 1 Singapore Dollar. You will 
be paid in cash at the end of the session privately. Please fill in the claim card 
with your ID and Password and bring it for payment collection. 
There will be a few control questions to test your understanding of the game 
before you proceed to the real decision. 
If you have any questions at this moment, please raise your hand and we will 
attend to you privately.  
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Welcome to this study on decision making!  
Before we start, please turn off your mobile phone and follow this instruction 
sheet closely while we are reading it out loud. It is crucial for you to 
understand the game before it starts. 
General Information 
In this study, there is a one-round decision making exercise which will last for 
about one hour.  
There are two players in the game, Player A and Player B. All Player As are 
placed in one room, and all Player Bs are placed in another room. Each player 
A will be randomly matched with a Player B to form a group by the computer. 
Player A and Player B in a group interact with each other during the session 
and their payoffs are determined by the decisions made by both sides. 
The study will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. The administrators can 
only identify you by the unique User ID you are assigned with. Participants 
will not be able to identify each other during and after the study as well. In 
other words, you will not know who your partner is in this study. Please rest 
assured that your anonymity as a decision maker is strictly preserved.  
The Game Structure 
In this room, all players are assigned the role as ‘Player B’. Both Player A and 
Player B begin with 100 points as their initial endowment. This game consists 
of two stages.   
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 Stage One  
In Stage One, Player A will decide how many points out from his/her given 
endowment he/she wants to pass on to you. Player A can pass 0 point, 10 
points, 20 points, 30 points, 40 points, 50 points, 60 points, 70 points, 80 
points, 90 points or 100 points to you. The points that Player A decides to pass 
on to you (Player B) will be TRIPLED in value when they reach you. Player A 
will keep the remaining points. 
Stage Two 
In Stage Two, you have the initial 100 points plus the TRIPLED points from 
Player A. as Player B, you have to decide: 
z How many points out of total points in your possession you want to 
pass back to Player A? These points will be added onto Player A’s 
earnings. 
You will keep the remaining points after deducting the points you allocate in 
decision 1 above as your own earnings. 
You will make these decisions in a “planned” manner, which means you will 
make a complete “decision plan” conditional on Player A’s potential decisions, 
even before you know Player A’s actual decision. Once Player A has made 
his/her “pass on” decision, your correspondence decision will be found in the 
plan and that particular decision will be realized. 
Earnings from the Game 
 
Based on the above two stages, your earnings are calculated in this way:  
Your earnings =   + 100 endowment points 
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 + Three times the points passed to you from Player A 
−  Points you give back to Player A 
The conversion rate for earnings is 10 points for 1 Singapore Dollar. You will 
be paid in cash at the end of the session privately. Please fill in the claim card 
with your ID and Password and bring it for payment collection. 
There will be a few control questions to test your understanding of the game 
before you proceed to the real decision. 
If you have any questions at this moment, please raise your hand and we will 








Welcome to this study on decision making!  
Before we start, please turn off your mobile phone and follow this instruction 
sheet closely while we are reading it out loud. It is crucial for you to 
understand the game before it starts. 
General Information 
In this study, there is a one-round decision making exercise which will last for 
about one hour.  
There are two players in the game, Player A and Player B. All Player As are 
placed in one room, and all Player Bs are placed in another room. Each player 
A will be randomly matched with a Player B to form a group by the computer. 
Player A and Player B in a group interact with each other during the session 
and their payoffs are determined by the decisions made by both sides. 
The study will be conducted in an anonymous fashion. The administrators can 
only identify you by the unique User ID you are assigned with. Participants 
will not be able to identify each other during and after the study as well. In 
other words, you will not know who your partner is in this study. Please rest 
assured that your anonymity as a decision maker is strictly preserved.  
The Game Structure 
In this room, all players are assigned the role as ‘Player B’. Both Player A and 
Player B begin with 100 points as their initial endowment. This game consists 
of two stages.   
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 Stage One  
In Stage One, Player A will decide how many points out from his/her given 
endowment he/she wants to pass on to you. Player A can pass 0 point, 10 
points, 20 points, 30 points, 40 points, 50 points, 60 points, 70 points, 80 
points, 90 points or 100 points to you. The points that Player A decides to pass 
on to you (Player B) will be TRIPLED in value when they reach you. Player A 
will keep the remaining points. 
Stage Two 
In Stage Two, you have the initial 100 points plus the TRIPLED points from 
Player A. as Player B, you have to decide: 
z How many points out of total points in your possession you want to 
donate to a charity. We will give brief information about this chosen 
charity to you shortly. 
You will keep the remaining points after deducting the points you donate in 
decision 1 above as your own earnings. 
You will make these decisions in a “planned” manner, which means you will 
make a complete “decision plan” conditional on Player A’s potential decisions, 
even before you know Player A’s actual decision. Once Player A has made 
his/her “pass on” decision, your correspondence decision will be found in the 
plan and that particular decision will be realized. Note that, Player A does not 
know that you have an option to donate to a charity. 
The Charity 
The charity chosen as the beneficiary of this study should you want to donate 
is a well-known international charitable organization named “Doctors without 
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 Borders”.  
“Doctors without Borders” is a secular humanitarian-aid non-governmental 
organization best known for its projects in war-torn regions and developing 
countries facing endemic diseases. We will show you a short video clip 
about this charity.  
Be assured that you are doing a real donation! At the end of the session, we 
will tally the total amount of each individual donation you have made and 
donate this total amount online through internet. You will witness the whole 
process of donation, and know that it is you who make the contributions. We 
will show you the confirmation from “Doctors without Borders” on the 
screen. 
Earnings from the Game 
Based on the above two stages, your earnings are calculated in this way:  
Your earnings =   + 100 endowment points 
+ Three times the points passed to you from Player A 
−  Points you donate to the charity  
The conversion rate for earnings is 10 points for 1 Singapore Dollar. You will 
be paid in cash at the end of the session privately. Please fill in the claim card 
with your ID and Password and bring it for payment collection. 
There will be a few control questions to test your understanding of the game 
before you proceed to the real decision. 
If you have any questions at this moment, please raise your hand and we will 
attend to you privately.  
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